Peace at Last?
| Wednesday, 8. September 2010 |
![]() Timo Behr
Researcher - The European Union research programme Following a two years hiatus and a considerable amount of US arms-twisting, negotiations for a final status agreement resumed last week in Washington DC. Flanked by President Obama, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu and Fatah’s Mahmud Abbas promised to negotiate in good faith with the aim of striking a historic compromise within one year. But what are the chances that they will succeed where their predecessors have failed? The prospects look daunting. Grand gestures aside, both parties have come to the table with a long list of preconditions. Netanyahu, time and again, has asserted that any settlement needs to be build around three principles: the recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state” (deflecting the “right of return”); the establishment of proper security measures (a euphemism for an IDF presence in the Jordan valley); and a definitive end to the conflict (to forestall future Arab claims). Abbas has balked at these conditions, demanding instead an indefinite end to settlement building and respect for the Palestinian right of return. Setting maximal goals is of course a common negotiation tactic. But to come to a solution, both leaders will be forced to compromise. Most analysts expect potential trade-offs to evolve around the so-called “Clinton Parameters”: land swaps to resolve the borders issue; the relinquishment of all but a symbolic right of return; Israel’s acceptance of East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state; and perhaps a temporary IDF presence in the Jordan Valley. To help both parties make these painful concessions, the Obama administration has chosen a new approach: this time US officials are involved from the very start in negotiations; all difficult issues are to be negotiated in a package deal to force both sides to compromise; and both sides have agreed to a one-year deadline. But will this be enough to conclude the deal? The problem is that even if Abbas and Netanyahu can be cajoled to agree on a US-mediated package, it is far from clear that they will be able to make it stick. Hamas has already shown its determination to spoil any agreement to which it is not a party through the use of violence. And a skeptical Israeli public is unlikely to endorse painful concessions in return for a partial peace settlement with a truncated Palestinian state. To convince both sides that their concessions will be rewarded, two things need to happen. First, the US needs to encourage other regional players to chip into a comprehensive package based on the Arab Peace Initiative. This could sweeten the deal for Israel, by increasing potential gains – especially if countries like Syria and Saudi Arabia agreed to end their support for organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. The quid pro quo would be for Israel to accept Palestinian rule in East Jerusalem and withdraw from the Golan Heights. Second, the US needs to work for Palestinian reconciliation – something it has not always done in the past. As Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak pointed out in a recent op-ed in the NY Times: “The Palestinians cannot make peace with a house divided.” Indeed, with Gaza excluded, any potential agreement seems doomed to fail. Only by combining carrots and sticks in such a way – drying up support for Israel’s radical opponents while offering them a role in a future Palestinian state – do current negotiations stand a reasonable chance of securing a final deal that is met with public approval. Any attempt to force a bilateral and partial settlement down the throat of a reluctant Palestinian and Israeli public is likely to condemn current talks to the same fate than earlier rounds. Ignoring this fact would mean certain failure for the “Obama approach” in the Middle East. Texts reflect the opinions of the individual authors |
Discussion (6 comments)Some reactions to your comments, which oddly have little to do with what I have written: On the contrary, my comments were focusing on the "detached from reality" type of thinking that passes for normal in the realm of many European and US liberal leaning think tanks. No offense intended. Let me first grapple with your responses, startig from No.4: I'll take your silence as a mea culpa. The reason that I did not answer you (as well as the source of my original puzzlement) is that I have clearly stated my position on this issue. As I pointed out in my original post, in my mind a combination of pressure (for some reason you chose to ignore this part of my argument) and incentives is the most promising way to achieve some progress towards intra-Palestinian reconciliation (and hence a settlement that can stick). You said: "The reason that I did not answer you (as well as the source of my original puzzlement) is that I have clearly stated my position on this issue. As I pointed out in my original post, in my mind a combination of pressure (for some reason you chose to ignore this part of my argument) and incentives is the most promising way to achieve some progress towards intra-Palestinian reconciliation (and hence a settlement that can stick)." |
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The "Obama Approach" thus far, has been a mixture of naive, opportunistic and bumbling attempts at trying to create inertia to a process/situation that has no interested players.
Besides, the moment Israel grants Abbas everything he wants, is the moment Abbas losses it all. No offense, but more than likely this truism passes over your head, due to what you have written here.
Here's another pickle for you. How can Hamas be expected to enter into an "honest reconciliation" with al-Fatah, knowing full well that in doing so, it means their forced recognition of the Jewish state of Israel (or even just Israel), though doing so means their tacit approval in turning their back on, and /or the dissolving of their movement whose own charter is based upon the forgeries of the Elders of Zion that demands the total destruction of Israel?
Face facts. Abbas is an incredibly weak, ineffectual leader who is looking over his shoulder at not only the Hamas, but potential political opponents from within his own ranks who make Abbas look like a moderate.
Another point. If Israel's enemies are not taking the current US administration seriously, (they all mock the US behind closed doors and openly through their foreign policy statements and actions) why do you think that Israel would be so willing to take the US seriously?
But this is the main reason why no peace has been able to be achieved, regardless of how many peace processes, or initiatives are thrown at it. Until the Arabs give up on the dream of having it all, the Arabs' war against Israel will continue.