

Peacekeeping - Peacebuilding

Preparing for the future

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About the authors

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Dr Erkki Tuomioja has served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland since 2000. He is a Doctor of Social Sciences, an economist and Member of Parliament of the Social Democratic Party. Dr Tuomioja is also an Adjunct Professor at the Department of Social Science History, University of Helsinki and

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* * *

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Introduction

Once upon a time, peacekeeping operations tended to be calm and consensual. There was a peace to be kept, and the peacekeepers were invited to do so by the parties to an already resolved conflict. Today's peacekeeping may take an entirely different form. There is less clarity about peace, the conflict might even be ongoing, with no clear views on who the parties to it actually are. Safeguarding civilians and the peacekeepers themselves may necessitate more use of force than before. Not taking sides may be difficult. The "international community" is called upon to help in diverse situations of tragedy and emergency. The international community, too, seems splintered into a multiplicity of different players, each of whom represents – well, just who exactly? In essence, instead of keeping the peace, the international community is invited to participate in the building of peace. But how can this be achieved?

Is peacekeeping being transformed into peacebuilding? What other forms will peacekeeping take in the future? Who is doing what, who should be doing what? How should one best prepare for tomorrow's peacekeeping operations? These were among the questions posed in the conference "Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future", held in Helsinki on 29 May 2006. The conference was organised by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and it was part of the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Finnish peacekeeping.

This report, based on the presentations held at the conference, invites contemplation of these difficult questions. The aim of the conference was to look at the future, at what would seem to be the main trends and tendencies, starting from an address on where we find ourselves right now. At the same time, the organisers sought to anchor the analysis in the Finnish – and also more broadly Nordic – perspective. Thus, both the North

and the South are represented: the report looks at peacekeeping from an African point of view as well as from the far North.

Among the central themes tackled in this report are the role and position of the United Nations today. Accordingly, the report asks what makes the UN unique, and whether other organisations, such as NATO and the EU, challenge it. The EU is often characterised as unique thanks to its unparalleled set of external policy tools. The UN is the “indispensable organisation”, as Lakhdar Brahimi underlines in his chapter – yet beset by the difficulties of maintaining its neutral and impartial reputation and image.

When looking at who today’s peacekeepers are, at who are the “hands” and “minds” of the operations, one finds a variety of actors, both state and non-state. What ensues is the inevitable need for coordination, or lack thereof, sometimes even competition, as Thierry Tardy suggests. There are also new patterns of countries, a new variety of origins of the people involved in the operations. As Espen Barth Eide notes, it is now predominantly countries from the South that make up the bulk of the troop commitments, no longer the North. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are among the new giants, but African countries also participate, being thus both contributors and hosts for peacekeeping operations. A trend observed by Cedric de Coning is the informal division of labour that emerges around the sequencing of peace operations whereby, for instance, the African Union’s initial stabilisation operation is followed by a UN complex peacekeeping operation.

The international community is faced with increasing expectations. Should it act rapidly, as Erkki Tuomioja underlines, or robustly, as de Coning suggests, or both? De Coning takes up the innovation of “collaborative offensive operations”, something that has emerged out of the nexus between peacebuilding and robust peacekeeping in the context of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). But what if the expectations soar too high? Too much robustness and too much haste may also have a detrimental effect. Quick fixes might not be the answer. Instead of superficial goals, more profound aspirations might be worth encouraging. Rule of law should be the goal rather than democracy. As Brahimi notes: security and justice are what people need and want.

The real challenge is to build lasting peace, Eide argues. It will no doubt be a time-consuming process, and an exercise in “staying power”; the ability of the international community to sustain an operation for long enough, and in so doing, to uphold the compassion and interest of people and decision-makers. The outlook for the UN Peacebuilding Commission, poised to help precisely in this difficult task, is touched upon both by Brahimi – who remains doubtful – and Eide, who is somewhat more confident and who argues that it will be able to play a vital and important role.

The presence of the international community, the duration of its stay and ultimate goals, are debated, and rightly so. Should the international community also assume the right to make decisions, not only on questions such as funding, but also on the setting of priorities, perhaps depriving the local or regional actors of decision-making autonomy as to the strategies and tactics to be employed? Can the international community be relied on to do what it says it will do?

Finally, where do the small Nordic countries fit into future operations? What is it that impels them to participate? Are their interests linked to their own security, their international responsibilities, or commitments to different organisations? As Admiral Juhani Kaskeala recalled in his seminar remarks, the Nordic UN peacekeepers no longer number thousands but only dozens. How come? Do they still possess special qualities that would greatly serve all the organisations involved, as Tuomioja suggests?

For readers of this report who are inspired to find out more, the “further reading” section at the end of the report provides references to the writings of the five distinguished authors. For my part, I would like to thank them all wholeheartedly for their involvement. I would also like to thank Lynn Nikkanen and Maarika Toivonen for their excellent work in proofreading and layout, all those who made the conference possible in the first place – both at the FIIA as well as in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs – and, finally, three eminent persons for their valuable contributions to the seminar: Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, Chief of Defence; Minister Jaakko Iloniemi; and Executive Director Pauliina Arola.

Hanna Ojanen
Helsinki, June 2006

United Nations Peace Operations in the 21st Century: A Few Personal Thoughts¹

Lakhdar Brahimi

There have been many occasions of late to sit back and reflect on issues related to peace and security and on the United Nations, to take stock of what has been achieved, what could have been done better, and where there have been failures. As a result, much was said or written on the subject on the occasion of the new Millennium in the year 2000, and again, last year when the UN celebrated its sixtieth birthday and convened the biggest International Conference ever at the Summit Level.

In this context, I have been asked to focus my remarks on the work of the United Nations. What advantage, if any, does the UN have over other organisations? What are the shortcomings that need to be addressed? How does the United Nations' rather large family of Agencies work (or fail to work) together, and how well (or badly) is coordination between all the actors (UN Missions and Agencies, donors, national and international NGOs) involved in and around a Peace operation facilitated?

To do so, I will draw essentially on my own, limited, personal experience. This contribution does not aim therefore to offer any definitive wisdom of any kind. It is simply a kind of eyewitness account of things I have seen, of activities I and other colleagues have conducted, and of lessons we have learned along the way.

The Indispensable Organisation

The new generation of peace operations probably started in Namibia in the late 1980s under the able leadership of a

distinguished citizen of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari. That was a spectacularly successful operation and was arguably very instrumental in winning the Nobel Peace Prize for the Blue Helmets.

Not all operations that ensued in the first half of the 1990s were as successful. Indeed, the United Nations suffered serious setbacks and I am sure all remember the horrors of Srebrenica in Bosnia and the even more horrific genocide in Rwanda. As a result of these shocking developments, in the mid-1990s very serious consideration was given to the suggestion that the Department of Peacekeeping in the Secretariat of the United Nations should be dismantled altogether.

Two frank and courageous reports on these two failures, followed in the year 2000 by the Report on United Nations Peace Operations produced by an Independent Panel which I had the privilege of chairing and which was endorsed by the Millennium Summit, in addition to the eruption of crises in rapid succession in Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, soon restored confidence in the United Nations. Member States (most of them at least) as well as the public at large saw that the United Nations, as the universal organisation, was uniquely qualified to take on such complex and delicate missions. The United Nations is transparent by nature: how can an organisation whose membership numbers 191 States be otherwise? At its best, it is also neutral, impartial and independent. It has no hidden agenda of any kind and is not threatening.

Furthermore, I believe that the United Nations has learned from its mistakes and is performing better today than it did in the early part of the 1990s. That is why DPKO is currently running some 18 Peacekeeping Missions and there are around 80,000 staff – military, police and civilian – deployed under the Blue Flag around the world.

In 2004 and 2005, The Rand Corporation published two books in which they examined seven or eight Peacekeeping Operations led by the United Nations and an equal number of military interventions led by the United States. The conclusion of these studies, led by Ambassador Jim Dobbins, who is probably the most experienced US diplomat in the field, was that UN-led operations were more successful and, of course, vastly less costly than US-led interventions.

Equally encouraging news came in the form of an excellent study entitled “The Human Security Report 2005”, published by a Canadian Research Centre. This study established that, contrary to the impression one gathers from the media, there is, today, more not less peace and security in the world than there was during the Cold War period. And this improvement, the report says, is due mainly to the work of the United Nations.

For these, and many other reasons, I sometimes call the United Nations “the indispensable organisation”. But let us not get carried away: there is no room for complacency. Included in the UN missions studied by the Rand Corporation are Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor, three tiny territories with small populations. Among the US-led interventions they, of course, list Iraq and Afghanistan. To compare Iraq and Afghanistan on the one hand to Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo or East Timor on the other does not offer a solid basis from which to draw any definitive conclusions.

The UN Dominated by the US and the West?

The failure of the United Nations to prevent the war in Iraq three years ago, the feeble pronouncements made about the pictures of humiliating abuse in the Abu Ghraib detention centre in Iraq and the daily reports of carnage coming out of Baghdad and the rest of that unfortunate country, and also the impotence and embarrassed silence of the United Nations in the face of gross human rights abuses and possibly even war crimes in Palestine have raised serious doubt about the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the United Nations. Increasingly, not only in the Muslim world but in most parts of the Third World and indeed in Europe itself, there is a growing perception that the United Nations is heavily influenced by one single country – the United States – and that it is almost always biased in favour of the interests of Western countries to the detriment of those of the developing world.

By way of example, I was in Sudan in May 2006 and I was profoundly saddened to hear people from all walks of life speaking of the proposed UN peacekeeping mission to Darfur as a “foreign military intervention by international forces”, and comparing it to the occupation of Iraq.

This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. For the staff of UN Peace Operations around the world, the negative perception of the United Nations has an immediate effect on their safety: in many places today, the white vehicles with the familiar letters U and N painted in black on both sides as well as the Blue Flag are not the symbols of neutrality and the source of protection they used to be. On the contrary, they have become targets for terrorist attacks as we saw with devastating effect in Baghdad on 19 August 2003.

There are a number of other issues that require the urgent attention of the Secretary General and that of the Member States of the United Nations. I shall address just a few of them.

Issues with Peace Operations

First, I would suggest that the manner in which we perceive and organise elections needs to be seriously reconsidered. In the early 1990s, we used to regard elections as “the exit strategy par excellence”. In other words, we thought that the ultimate purpose of a peacekeeping operation was to hold Presidential and Parliamentary elections. If that is done technically well, then success has been achieved, peace restored, democracy installed, and we tell ourselves we may now wrap up and leave. We are somewhat wiser today. We have seen on many occasions that elections that are held prematurely do not yield all the good that is expected of them. It even happened that elections that were seen as successful, free and fair, actually became the direct cause of the resumption of conflict: a case in point was Angola in 1992. And one need look no further than Haiti today for another example.

Furthermore, elections organised by the UN or other international bodies are usually extremely costly. In Afghanistan, the Presidential elections in 2004 and the Parliamentary and local elections in 2005 came with a price tag approaching 250 million dollars. That is about 50% of the budget of the Afghan State. I am told that each vote cost us around 8 dollars in Afghanistan. The same vote costs 3 dollars in Australia and only 1.30 dollars in Indonesia.

In addition, as elections are organised for the most part by foreign experts, no local capacity to speak of is left behind in the

present system. There is much to learn from countries like India, Malaysia and Indonesia. Actually, I heard that the US Congress sent a delegation to New Delhi a couple of years ago to seek advice on how to avoid a repetition of the events in Miami during the Presidential Election of 2000! Should not the UN do the same?

Constitution-making should be approached with the same care and caution. Afghanistan would have managed another 10 or 20 years with the 1964 Constitution as it was amended at the Bonn Conference. In Iraq, constitution-making was flawed as a process and in substance. It is expected that the constitution which was adopted in November 2005 will have to be significantly amended in the foreseeable future, less than a year later. This new process, if it takes place at all, will be very divisive. Indeed, some would even go as far as to say that this Iraqi Constitution is such that it will divide, not unite, the country and its people.

My second observation is also fundamental. When a peace-keeping operation is undertaken, the country concerned is, by and large, in a state of total neglect. Destruction will have gone on for a long time, social services such as water, electricity, health and education facilities will be almost non-existent, roads will be in an appalling condition, and state structures will have all but disintegrated. Understandably, the United Nations, donors, various agencies and NGOs all want to help. But this well-meaning approach is not without its problems.

To begin with, far too many players literally descend on the country concerned. In Afghanistan, for example, every single United Nation Agency, fund or programme is there and the number of foreign staff of the NGO community was still at over 800 before the new flare up of violence.

The government of the recipient country will justifiably complain that much too high a proportion of the donated funds is not channelled through the State budget. As Ashraf Ghani, the former Minister of Finance in Afghanistan puts it, parallel foreign structures are created to compete with the State instead of supporting and strengthening its own structures. The local elite will refuse to work for the state and will accept almost any jobs with foreign entities. It is not uncommon to find lawyers, teachers, even doctors, working as drivers or office clerks for the United Nations, NGOs or embassies.

Although the role of the United Nations as coordinator for all foreign actors is accepted by all in principle, coordination in most peacekeeping operations is, at best, a series of regular meetings to exchange information. There is not much discipline and neither waste nor duplication of effort is really avoided.

Furthermore, coordination should be about more than simply the way in which aid funds are used, important as that is. Coordination should also be, at a higher level, about determining which player has, in a given situation, the comparative advantage to take on a particular job.

What is more, our claims to address all the ills of the society concerned will raise the expectations of the local population to dangerously high levels. When these expectations are not met, disappointment, anger, and even hostility may well supplant the cordiality with which UN and other aid workers are greeted at the beginning of the mission.

It is therefore important for the international community to set modest and achievable objectives for itself. It must be made abundantly clear to local leaders as well as to the general public that what is on offer is not an open-ended commitment to provide for every need, for everyone, and for an unlimited period of time. What is on offer is a helping hand, for a limited period of time, with the understanding that the local people should make the best of this opportunity and make the best possible use of the time and the resources available to prepare themselves to take charge of their own destiny.

In this context, I believe that in addition to humanitarian relief, the main area of focus for the international community should be the rule of law: police, justice and detention and rehabilitation centres. A country coming out of conflict needs help in two priority areas: an end to violence, in its various forms – not only an end to fighting, but also, just as importantly, the possibility for any citizen, man or woman, rich or poor, city dweller, farmer or Bedouin nomad to seek protection from the state and gain redress for any wrongdoing or injustice. For that, what is needed is an effective police force and a functioning judicial system, with credible courts and decent detention and rehabilitation facilities.

I for one will not hesitate to say that these needs are more important and more urgent than elections or a new constitution. They are the indispensable foundation on which a state can be

built. And if there is no state, our eloquent promises of peace, democracy and reconstruction are no more than empty rhetoric.

In the ambitious reform programme now under consideration, two new bodies are being created which, it is hoped, will further improve the performance of the United Nations: the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. I wish both of them every success. I will nevertheless venture to express a somewhat sceptical view about the Peacebuilding Commission, while fervently hoping that my pessimism will prove unfounded. My fears stem from the fact that, with a core membership of 31 member states and a number of other actors including the World Bank, the IMF and other UN Agencies, the Commission will bring together up to fifty participants when it meets to consider a specific case. That is a mini-General Assembly and my fear is that it may become a debating forum rather than an effective operational tool to help a country rebuild itself after conflict.

What is important, however, is that the international community is now fully aware that a serious and long-lasting commitment is needed if peacekeeping is to succeed even better than it has in the past.

References

¹ Ambassador Brahimi started his seminar presentation by congratulating both the people and the government of Finland on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of their participation in the United Nations' Peacekeeping operations. He also thanked and congratulated the people and government of Finland most warmly for their generous contribution and their remarkable commitment to the principles of the Charter and the ideals of the United Nations.

Peacekeeping in Finnish Foreign and Security Policy

Erkki Tuomioja

UN Peacekeeping: a Finnish Trademark

The Suez Crisis erupted in autumn 1956, heralding a new and challenging situation for Finnish foreign policy. At that time, Finland had just become a member of the United Nations. After eight years, the General Assembly had finally come to a decision on Finland's membership in December 1955. On the home front, an exciting presidential election campaign had run its course and the new president, Urho Kekkonen, had started his first term in office in March 1956. Observers kept a close eye on whether the direction of Finnish foreign policy would change or not, while international tensions mounted again due to the events in Hungary. The Security Council was paralyzed, and the decision on a peacekeeping operation in Suez, UNEF I, was duly made by the General Assembly in November, using the Uniting for Peace formula. In that context, Finland's decision to send a Finnish contingent to Sinai was an audacious one for a country which had opted for a very low-profile policy up to then. Active involvement in the efforts to solve an international crisis was something very new in Finnish foreign policy, but gaining more influence in international relations in general, and giving support to the UN as a new member in particular, was deemed necessary. The Finnish contingent marked the beginning of a historical process, which was arguably not so intentional at the time but which, over time, grew into one of the most well-known Finnish trademarks and success stories.

Finnish neutrality sat comfortably with the evolving peacekeeping concept of the United Nations. During the Cold

War, traditional peacekeeping operations were based on the consent of the parties to the conflict. Finland soon became a great power in peacekeeping, whose services were really needed. Also very natural in our otherwise not so global foreign and security policy was participation in the UN peacekeeping operations, namely the exercise of a policy of active neutrality, which meant active efforts to reduce tensions between the military powers and to solve conflicts peacefully while, at the same time, enhancing Finland's international position. Cooperation between the Nordic countries intensified. National decision-making, financing and legislative procedures started to develop gradually. Conflicts in the Middle East, especially in Sinai, Golan and Lebanon, duly became familiar to thousands of Finns, as did Cyprus. Dispatching peacekeepers to Namibia also proved that when the sense of solidarity is strong enough, national obstacles can be overcome. Sending experienced military observers to various parts of the world, such as Kashmir since 1961, became an essential part of our peacekeeping activities.

Over the years, we have gained more experience and Finnish peacekeepers have demonstrated their real capabilities. The conscription system, good civilian education system and professional skills combined with high-quality military training for the volunteers have resulted in troops who can interact smoothly and calmly with all parties and the local population in the conflict area.

The Finnish system of using volunteer reservists for peacekeeping tasks produces troops with practically unparalleled capabilities. The extensive civilian professional expertise of our reservists is put to use in our peacekeeping operations, from coaching multi-ethnic teams in basketball to literally building bridges between communities previously at war with each other. Little wonder that Finnish peacekeepers have widely appreciated special strengths when it comes to CIMIC activities (civilian-military cooperation). At the same time, no one can fault our troops for lack of military expertise and preparedness.

Since the 1990s, the scope and nature of the Finnish participation has expanded. The European Union launched its first two military crisis management operations in 2003, and NATO has also become active in global crisis management. The

wars in the Western Balkans in the 1990s made a stronger international presence unavoidable. Finland also focused attention on the Balkan operations. Today Finland contributes 180 peacekeepers to the EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 400 peacekeepers to the NATO-led KFOR operation in Kosovo. In 2003, NATO took over the international operation in Afghanistan, ISAF, where Finland now has about 100 peacekeepers. The importance of civilian crisis management has grown rapidly, and about 100 Finnish experts are serving in various missions every year.

In the past 50 years, peacekeeping has thus played a prominent role in Finnish foreign and security policy. First and foremost, it has been based on the security concept according to which enhancing security in the neighbourhood or, even more broadly, in Europe is crucial but not enough. Peacekeeping has also served as a key tool in our UN policy. It has opened up a channel to extensive participation and a more active international role than would otherwise have been possible, and it has also been useful for the development of the capabilities of the Finnish defence forces. Our peacekeeping efforts have also enjoyed broad political support among the political parties.

A Strengthened Sense of Global Responsibility through EU Membership

Today, the experience and know-how we have accumulated in crisis management is one of the key assets in our foreign and security policy. In the global security environment of the 21st century, the demands are more challenging than before and the crises more complex. At the same time, we have acquired a deeper understanding of the broader factors affecting security and causing conflicts. Our security interests are genuinely global. Strengthening the United Nations and the multilateral system as well as international law is also one of the basic goals of Finnish foreign and security policy in 2006. The principles of the UN Charter are as valid as ever. It is the responsibility of the international community to prevent crises and to protect civilian populations.

Membership of the European Union has brought with it an increased sense of global responsibility in Finland. We have been active in preparing the civilian and military crisis management

concepts, and historical decisions were subsequently made in Helsinki in December 1999 during Finland's first EU Presidency. The Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been a success. Within a few years, we have been able to put all the necessary structures in place, develop the required capabilities and launch solid operations. Finland has always been prepared to do its share or even more. We have participated in almost all of the EU operations conducted so far, and our expertise and the level of participation have been highly valued. In the future, too, we will participate fully in the development and implementation of the common security and defence policy of the Union. Enhancing national civilian and military capabilities is therefore indispensable, especially when it comes to rapid response capabilities. Right now Finland is preparing for EU Battle Groups and Civilian Response Teams. There will also be an increasing demand for broad expertise in civilian crisis management, such as the promotion of human rights, rule of law and gender equality.

NATO has also upgraded its military crisis management capacity and readiness. Participation in the UN-mandated and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo is an important element of our Partnership with NATO. In the process which is underway to enhance the NATO Partnerships, the main objective for Finland is consequently improved access to information and decision-shaping in the operations in which we participate.

Need for Rapid Response

History and the present we know, but what of the future? The nature of conflicts has changed since the Cold War; even if there are fewer unresolved conflicts than earlier, the need for international involvement is perhaps greater than ever before. The European Union and NATO as well as various regional organisations, such as the African Union, are building up their capabilities to respond to this need for international actors.

All key international actors are now striving to solve the multiple challenges of conflict prevention and resolution. Two goals seem to stand out: to become capable of rapid response and to achieve coherence. In the European Union, Finland has been active in developing the Battle Group concept. During our EU Presidency, the work will be finalized and full

operational capability will be reached on 1 January 2007. The Union will be able to carry out two rapid response operations simultaneously, each Battle Group comprising about 1,500 personnel plus the requisite support elements. These troops enable the Union to carry out the tasks set out in the ESDP and the European Security Strategy, such as supporting the UN operations in Africa. Finland will participate in two Battle Groups: the first of these is with Germany and the Netherlands and will be ready to stand by in the first half of 2007, while the second, with Sweden, Norway, Estonia and possibly Ireland, will be ready in the first half of 2008.

Rapid response also involves responsibility. The international community must be able to reach decisions rapidly – capabilities will not help if there is no willingness to use them. For example in Sudan, it has been very difficult to procure the promised military and police resources from the EU Member States. Now, with the peace agreement on Darfur, we have to seriously consider what the optimal contribution of the EU and its Member States will be.

Rapid response is an even more important – and more challenging – aspect of civilian crisis management. Civilian expertise should be employed at a much earlier phase of operations than that which prevails at present. Sometimes a timely civilian crisis management operation can reduce the need for, or at least the duration of, a massive military operation. The European Union is now mobilising and training its first crisis response teams in the task of rapid fact-finding, and Finland is also participating in that activity.

Optimal and timely use of civilian and military resources will be a huge challenge in the coming years. We will put greater emphasis on this both nationally and in the European Union. The best way to respond to the need for increased civilian-military coordination would be to make a coherent approach an integral part of the planning phase of operations, and even earlier than that, an essential element of training and exercises. This would also have an impact on the distribution of resources.

Enhancing Human Security

But the challenges that lie ahead in future peacekeeping and crisis management activities do not end here. In our foreign and security

policy, we have already accepted the need for greater coherence and active use of all instruments at our disposal when confronted with new conflicts. Now we need to refine this principle and translate it into concrete action. We need more focused policies in conflict prevention. We need determined post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction measures in order to prevent new outbreaks of conflict. Targeted measures, such as a reform of the security sector and reintegration of the combatants and their disarmament are also needed. Human rights aspects need to be mainstreamed in crisis management – in operations as well as in training. Women and children in conflicts should be a special concern. Overall, more attention to human security is required, which means not only freedom from fear but also freedom from want, and the freedom to act on one's own behalf. All these aspects are essential when defining the concrete interlinkages of security and development. With targeted development policy instruments, we can markedly contribute to the enhancement of sustainable peace.

As early as 2004, the need for a human security approach was highlighted by Dr Mary Kaldor who, with a study group, issued a report proposing a Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The objective of this human security approach is a broad and challenging one: not only freedom from fear but also freedom from want. The focus of our action and policy should be on achieving security and development for human beings, not just for states. And security in its true meaning covers not only the physical aspects of security, but also the material side. The European Union, with the unique set of external policy tools it has at its disposal, be it crisis management, development or trade policy, is well placed to rise to this challenge. Increasing coherence among all actors and all levels is the best way forward.

With these new demands for global security, one question remains – can we be as brave and innovative in our response in the future as we were in 1956?

The EU and NATO as peacekeepers: Open Cooperation *versus* Implicit Competition

Thierry Tardy

The Different Roads to Peacekeeping

If the EU and NATO can be considered full peacekeeping actors as such, the roads that both organisations have taken to reach this point were different. NATO has embraced peacekeeping reluctantly while peacekeeping is part of the EU's quest for security actor status.

NATO embraced the activity of crisis management in the context of the Yugoslav wars, as a result of two developments. First, peace operations appeared as a response to the existential crisis that NATO was going through following the end of the Cold War. Yet, NATO never considered the activity of peacekeeping as a logical continuation of its Cold War mandate. Second, NATO became involved in peace operations because of its military nature, which provided it with the capacity to contribute to peace operations in an allegedly more efficient way than any other security institution. This second element has led to the paradox by which the military is most needed in peace operations although it is uncertain whether peacekeeping is, at its core, a task for the military. From these two developments it follows that NATO embraced peacekeeping with mixed feelings of necessity and reluctance. Peacekeeping became a *raison d'être* by default.

The European Union undertook a different route in becoming a peacekeeping actor. Peacekeeping has been a key objective in

the EU's quest for fully-fledged security actor status. It is what the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is all about. EU member states may diverge on the extent to which EU peace operations should be an end (the British view), or just a step towards a more ambitious role (the French approach), but the EU "capacity for autonomous action [...] in order to respond to international crises"¹ is nonetheless a central element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Furthermore, unlike NATO, the EU totally lacked the capacity to conduct peace operations when the CFSP was initially framed, and it therefore had to create it from scratch. Despite the difficulties that the EU faces in building its own capacities, being a peacekeeper has become a *raison d'être* by design.

Concepts, Mandates, Capabilities: Similarities and Differences

NATO has 15 years of experience in peace operations while the EU is still a nascent peacekeeper. Both institutions have encountered difficulty in conceptualizing peace operations, but NATO has been able to look at the doctrinal aspects of what it calls Peace Support Operations in a more elaborated way than the EU. Concepts such as 'peacekeeping' or 'peace enforcement' have been analysed within NATO in a more systematic manner. Furthermore, EU member states continue to have divergent views on what the 'Petersberg missions' are about, in particular the upper-end tasks and their level of coerciveness. Definitions and policy implications of the use of force or of terms such as 'peace-making'² or 'preventive engagement' are equally ambiguous.

NATO's conception of peacekeeping is dominated by military aspects and draws heavily on the existing NATO military doctrine corpus. It reflects a narrowly-defined conception of security, which tends to focus on military issues. Over the last few years, NATO has widened the scope of its missions and started to integrate the civilian dimension, through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, disaster relief operations and civil protection. Furthermore, civilian crisis management and peacebuilding issues are on the agenda of the November 2006 Riga Summit. There is a sense within NATO that crisis management, particularly in post-conflict environments,

Ongoing (11)	Completed (4)
<p><i>Europe</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina* • EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina • EUPAT in FYROM (Police Advisory Team) • EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine <p><i>Middle East – Asia</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories • EU BAM Rafah in the Palestinian Territories • EUJUST Lex for Iraq • EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh <p><i>Africa</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUPOL 'Kinshasa' in the DRC • EUSEC in the DRC • EU Support to AMIS II in Darfur** • EUFOR DRC (forthcoming)* 	<p><i>Europe</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concordia in FYROM* • Proxima in FYROM <p><i>Caucasus</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUJUST Themis in Georgia <p><i>Africa</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Artemis in the DRC*

Table 1: EU operations (as of May 2006)

*military operation **with some military elements

Source: EU website (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=fr&id=268&mode=g&name=)

Ongoing (7)	Completed (7)
<p><i>Europe</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KFOR in Kosovo • NATO HQ in Bosnia-Herzegovina • NATO HQ – Skopje in FYROM • 'Active Endeavour' in the Mediterranean* <p><i>Middle East – Asia</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF in Afghanistan • NATO Training Mission in Iraq <p><i>Africa</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO Assistance Mission in Darfur 	<p><i>Europe</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina • Essential Harvest / 'Amber Fox' / 'Allied Harmony' in FYROM • NATO Assistance Mission to Greece • Operation 'Allied Force' in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia <p><i>Middle East – Asia</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO Assistance Mission to Pakistan • NATO Defensive Assistance to Turkey <p><i>United States</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO Assistance Mission to the US (Katrina)

Table 2: NATO operations (as of May 2006)

*Article 5 operation (following the events of 11 September)

Source: NATO website (<http://www.nato.int/>)

cannot be confined to military issues, and therefore that the military vocation of the organisation must be revisited. Despite these recent evolutions, the military culture still largely prevails within the Atlantic Alliance.

In contrast, the EU comprehensive conception of security leads to a much more wide-ranging approach to peace operations, combining military and civilian aspects, to be addressed in all phases of the conflict cycle. It follows a reluctance to be confined to civilian aspects or 'soft power' issues when NATO is dealing with the military tasks. In practice, the concomitant evolution of NATO and the EU means that their respective conceptions of peace operations are likely to converge rather than diverge. Such convergence may create some complementarity, but it will also inevitably create duplication, and therefore possible tensions.

For both institutions, capabilities are a mix of national and institutional assets. At these two levels, NATO has a clear advantage in the military field while the EU displays comparative advantages in the civilian field. At the military level, NATO can draw on American assets as well as on NATO's institutional structure. On the EU side, the absence of a permanent operational planning structure prevents the emergence of a fully-fledged crisis management capacity and has led to the dependence on NATO assets, formalised by the Berlin Plus arrangement. Consequently, while NATO has already demonstrated its ability to deploy a corps-level operation and should reach full operational capability for its 25,000 strong NATO Response Force by the end of 2006, the EU has encountered difficulties in meeting the Helsinki Headline Goal. It is now aiming at a more flexible and qualitative approach, through the Headline Goal 2010 and the Battle Group concept, but still lacks some key military assets (command and control, operational planning, strategic airlift). At the civilian level, the EU capabilities are shared between the Commission and the civilian dimension of the ESDP (Headline Goal 2008); the potential is much larger here than for NATO, though the EU needs to better coordinate its own instruments.

In terms of areas of intervention, recent evolutions of the international environment have led both institutions to aspire to play global roles, and to be ready to intervene beyond their original areas of responsibility. NATO's current operations in Afghanistan and Darfur and the EU's operations in Indonesia

and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table above) put an end to the 'out of area' debate. As a matter of fact, the EU runs more operations outside Europe than within Europe and NATO has as many operations within Europe as it has outside.

Open Cooperation *versus* Implicit Competition

The EU and NATO have developed a relationship that is characterised by open cooperation as much as by implicit competition. On the one hand, the two organisations have a common interest in cooperation and do cooperate at headquarters level and on the ground, through a range of well-established mechanisms (NAC-PSC meetings, Berlin Plus agreement, respective military liaison cells at SHAPE and EUMS, EU-NATO working groups). Overall, the relationship in 2006 is much smoother than it was in the years 1998-2002.

Yet, as peacekeeping actors, the EU and NATO have *de facto* embarked on a logic of implicit competition. Neither of these two institutions is a well-established actor in the crisis management field; both must demonstrate their added value and comparative advantages, and in a way develop the same tools to meet the same needs. In its quest for autonomy, the EU needs to overcome its inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* NATO, while NATO wishes to retain a certain degree of supremacy. This situation is conducive to competition, which may have been evidenced in the unnecessary duplication of effort observed in Sudan/Darfur, where both organisations wanted to ensure their visibility, sometimes at the expense of the other, or to a lesser extent in the difficult EU-NATO communication when the EU took over the SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³ In this particular case, which was the first real test for the Berlin Plus agreement, implementation was constrained by two factors: first, the fact that NATO remained present in Bosnia-Herzegovina contrary to the letter of the Berlin Plus agreement (that should apply "when NATO as a whole is not involved"); and second, the fact that EU-NATO cooperation proved to be necessary beyond the framework of Berlin Plus, to encompass a broader range of crisis management activities, including civilian tasks.⁴ In other words, if the Berlin Plus arrangement facilitates EU-NATO cooperation in some specific cases, it lacks flexibility and is too narrow to address the needs of

EU-NATO cooperation in peace operations. More generally, the fact that the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the EU Battle Groups draw on the same pool of resources for missions that may prove to be similar in practice (if not in theory), creates duplication that adds to the inter-institutional competition. At the same time, their structure and some similarities in their mandate and areas of intervention imply close cooperation between the two forces, in terms of standards, rotations of on-call units, and even possible co-deployment. The NRF and the Battle Groups may be 'mutually reinforcing',⁵ but the extent to which they are in competition refers to the broader EU-NATO political relationship, rather than to their respective mandates.

Relations with the UN

EU and NATO conceptions of their relations with the UN can be analysed at two different levels: first, the legal/normative role of the UN Security Council and its impact on EU and NATO postures and policies; second, the operational relationship among organisations that increasingly play on the same ground.

As far as the legal issue is concerned, EU and NATO positions are not as different as they may appear. First, neither NATO nor the EU consider themselves as regional arrangements in the sense of chapter VIII of the UN Charter. NATO's approach is of course largely determined by the US presence and the Atlantic Alliance

	NRF	Battle Groups (BGs)
Mandate	Initial entry force; contribution to the full range of NATO operations; prevention of escalation of conflicts.	Full range of 'Petersberg Tasks'. Stand-alone or bridging operations.
Format	25,000 troops (including ground, air, and maritime assets)	Between 13 and 18 BGs of 1,500 personnel each (with two possibly deployed simultaneously)
Self-sustainability	30 days	120 days
Full Operational Capability	Late 2006	2007

Table 3: The NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups

has already demonstrated its readiness to circumvent the UN Security Council in a coercive operation. The old motto “with the UN whenever possible, without when necessary” encapsulates NATO’s view of the conditions under which a UN Security Council resolution is needed before military action is taken. In the field of peace operations, NATO’s eagerness to act under a UN mandate (as is the case in Kosovo or Afghanistan) is more obvious, but this cannot be taken for granted.⁶

In contrast, the EU commits itself to the UN and its legal/normative dimension in a more clear-cut manner. The *European Security Strategy* (ESS) reasserts that “The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter” and quite a few EU member states are adamant that any action that the EU undertakes must be carried out in accordance with the UN Charter. Furthermore, one central element of the Battle Group concept was originally that such units would be deployed primarily, though not exclusively, in response to UN requests. Yet, ambiguity remains as to the extent to which the EU wants to place its action under a UN framework. By extension, it is the whole idea of the subordination of the use of force to the UN Charter that remains unclear in the EU discourse. The EU is openly committed to the UN and what it represents, but such a commitment could be called into question if it conflicts with strategic interests of EU member states, and to a lesser extent with the autonomy of the EU. Both NATO and the EU are reluctant to condition their policies to a vote cast at the UN Security Council, i.e. to a Russian and Chinese vote.

At the operational level, the EU-NATO-UN triangular relationship is characterised by an imbalance in which the UN, which deploys many more people in peace operations than the EU and NATO put together, is in a position to demand EU and NATO member states’ assets; the EU and NATO are eager to provide some support but with huge limitations. With different degrees of depth and commitment (the EU having formalised its relations with the UN much more than NATO has⁷), the two regional organisations have recently developed closer relations with the UN in the field of peace operations and have cooperated with the UN on a number of occasions, including the DRC, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Darfur. At the same time, both the EU and NATO are reluctant to be too constrained by the UN. This

leads to a conception of cooperation with the UN that is inherently limited in the military field (restricted to activities such as planning, logistics, information-sharing, and possibly bridging operations and strategic reserve), but more promising at the civilian level (at least as far as the EU is concerned).

Conclusion

Both the EU and NATO are going through a period of profound change as well as through a period of crisis.⁸ In the field of peace operations, the EU derives from a civilian power status and aspires to cover the whole range of crisis management activities, while NATO is a military organisation that wishes to develop a broader conception of peace operations that somehow integrates the civilian dimension.

While these evolutions make sense for each organisation taken individually, they do not reflect any kind of strategic vision at the EU-NATO level. Overall, these developments are taking place in a largely uncoordinated way and are likely to lead to some duplications and further competition.

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¹ Joint Declaration on European Defence, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998.

² The term 'peace-making' used in the list of the Petersberg Tasks means 'peace-enforcement' in EU terminology but peaceful settlement of disputes in UN terminology.

³ The division of labour between the EU and NATO once the EU had taken over the SFOR in December 2004 was not always clear; furthermore, information sharing between the two organisations proved to be difficult.

⁴ See *NATO and the European Union: Improving Practical Cooperation*. A Transatlantic Workshop organised by the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Partnership with the Ministry of Defence of Finland, Washington, DC, March 2006.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁶ For example, operations 'Essential Harvest', 'Amber Fox' and 'Allied Harmony' in FYROM had not been created by UN Security Council resolutions.

⁷ See "Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management", 24 September 2003. At NATO's initiative, NATO and the UN are currently working on a joint declaration.

⁸ See "Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture", The Atlantic Council, Policy Paper, March 2006; and Sven Biscop, "NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: No Transformation without Re-Equilibration", Egmont Paper 11, Academia Press, 2006.

The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa

Cedric de Coning

While western foreign policy, security and media attention was on Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans over the last decade, Africa emerged as the major arena for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.¹ Of the 18 peace operations currently managed by the UN, 8 are in Africa, and 6 of those are large and complex. This explains why 75% of the approximately 88,000 military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers currently deployed can be found in Africa. The emphasis on this part of the world is also reflected in the UN peacekeeping budget. Of the approximate \$5 billion budgeted for 2005/ 2006, around 77% is budgeted for operations in Africa.²

Peacekeeping is also a dominant theme for the African Union (AU). Over the last half-decade the AU has undertaken two major peacekeeping operations of its own, in Burundi and Sudan, involving 10,000 peacekeepers at a total cost of approximately \$600 million.³ Africa is, of course, also a significant troop contributor to UN peace operations, with 34 African countries contributing 28% of the UN's uniformed peacekeepers.

In comparison with the peacekeeping missions in Africa during the mid- to late-1990s, the new trend towards large, complex peace operations represents a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in peace operations in Africa.

This trend should not, however, be interpreted as signifying a new interest in the UN or in Africa. Rather, the willingness to invest more than \$5 billion in UN peace operations was generated in, and will be sustained by, the post-9/11 belief that failed states

are ideal training, staging and breeding grounds for international terrorists.⁴

In this context, a kind of informal peacekeeping *Apartheid* has come about, whereby most European and American peacekeeping and offensive forces are deployed in NATO or European Union (EU) operations in Europe and the Middle-East, whilst most UN peacekeeping troops are contributed by the developing world and deployed in Africa.⁵

Whilst this division of roles reflects the macro-pattern, it masks an interesting sub-trend that has emerged over the last three years. Almost a decade after Somalia and Rwanda resulted in the West withholding its peacekeepers from Africa, we now see a new willingness to consider deploying European peacekeepers to Africa.

In 2003 the EU deployed operation Artemis in Bunia, in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The success of this kind of focussed but robust intervention encouraged the EU to follow up with further such missions. In June 2004, the EU deployed military, police and civilian observers and advisors in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). And earlier this year, the EU approved a new mission to the DRC, this time in support of the elections scheduled for 30 July 2006. These developments have opened up debate around Europe's future defence and security policy towards Africa, and have stimulated the discussions around a possible NATO role in, for instance, Darfur.

Troop contributions, however, reflect only one facet of the geo-political reality. The financing of UN and African peace operations reveal another. Through the assessed contribution system, the USA is responsible for 26% of the UN peacekeeping budget, while Europe's combined contribution represents approximately 43%. Together, America, Japan and Europe are responsible for approximately 88% of the UN peacekeeping budget.

America and Europe are also major financial contributors to African peacekeeping. In 2004 the EU contributed approximately 25 million euros to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and it has contributed approximately 162 million euros to AMIS since its inception in 2004.⁶ Bilateral contributions by individual EU member states amount to an additional 30 million euros or

thereabouts. The USA has contributed approximately \$220 million to AMIS since the mission's inception.⁷

From a UN and African perspective, the USA and Europe thus have a major political and financial influence on, and stake in, the future of peacekeeping in Africa. Furthermore, it is anticipated that they will have a continued interest in supporting the development of a balanced capacity to manage conflicts in Africa that will ensure that there is robustness at all levels – international, regional and sub-regional – in the system.

United Nations Peace Operations

Contemporary UN complex peace operations are, in effect, peacebuilding operations in that they have mandates that combine political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict.

The UN's capability to undertake such system-wide peacebuilding operations is what sets it apart from NATO and the AU. The EU is the only other multilateral body that has the potential to develop such a complex peacebuilding operations capacity in the mid- to long-term. And the EU is the only multilateral body that has the potential to integrate a sixth dimension, namely trade.

Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proved to be a daunting task for the UN. In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the Integrated Missions model that is essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN Country Team, which is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peacekeeping operation, which is peace and security focussed. The current UN missions in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Southern Sudan all have Integrated Mission management structures.

As with any new innovation, this model has not been without its detractors, and it has highlighted various technical, administrative, organizational and budgetary challenges which need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented. A comprehensive study⁸ was commissioned and

completed in May 2005, and as of December 2005, Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted as the mission structure of choice.⁹ It will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations in the near- to mid-term, and it is likely that the EU, the AU and others will try to apply its core features to their own future missions.

Another trend is the new more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although such operations in Africa are still rooted in, and characterized by, the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice have undergone significant development.

Consent still implies that the parties to the conflict must agree to the UN's peacekeeping role, but it is now recognized that strategic consent at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent at all levels in the field.

Impartiality still implies that the UN peacekeeping mission will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict, but does not imply that the UN will stand by when civilians are in imminent threat of danger, nor that it will not record and report (for instance to the International Criminal Court) human rights abuses that may have taken or are still taking place, including those committed by the parties to the conflict.

Minimum use of force still implies that the UN peacekeeping mission will use the minimum amount of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is now understood that it should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats to itself or those it has been mandated to protect.

It is unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that the UN Security Council will deploy new complex peace operations in Africa, or elsewhere, without mandates that reflect this new interpretation and contain elements of Chapter 7's enforcement authority.

One of the innovations that emerged from the nexus between peacebuilding and robust peacekeeping in the context of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is collaborative offensive operations. MONUC is operating alongside, and in support of, the integrated brigades of the Armed

Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the FARDC) in offensive operations aimed at protecting civilians and forcefully disarming armed groups.

Some of these collaborative offensive operations had the desired effect in that they have resulted in larger numbers of combatants entering the disarmament process. However, these operations have also posed various technical, budgetary and administrative challenges. The most serious concerns relate to the unintended consequences generated by these UN-directed and -supported actions, including the impact of the predatory behaviour of some of the FARDC troops on the populations where they have been deployed, and the human rights abuses and internal displacements that have come about as a result.

Another interesting example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohesion across the traditional security and development divide is the way in which protection is emerging as a common theme for both the humanitarian and peacekeeping community. Since 1999, seven UN peace operations – Burundi, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan – have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.¹⁰ Civilian protection is set to become one of the dominant themes of UN peace operations in the short- to medium-term.

African Peace Operations

Over the past half-decade, the AU, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC, have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations. The AU, in particular, has played a leading role by deploying its first two peace operations, AMIB in Burundi and AMIS in Darfur.

One of the most significant developments in the African context is the informal division of roles that has emerged around the sequencing of peace operations. The pattern that is taking shape is that the AU, or one of the RECs, first deploy a stabilization operation, followed by a UN complex peacekeeping operation within approximately 90 to 120 days.

This pattern was established in Burundi, where the AU deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) in 2004; and repeated in Liberia, where ECOWAS deployed

ECOMIL in 2003, followed by a UN operation (UNMIL) later in the same year; and it is set to be repeated again in Darfur where the AMIS, first established in 2004, is likely to be replaced by a UN mission later in 2006.

This sequencing of operations appears to work well because it draws on the respective strengths of the UN, the AU and the RECs. The UN is averse to deploying peace operations in situations where a comprehensive peace agreement is not yet in place, and when it does receive the green light to deploy, it needs approximately 90 days to muster the political process necessary to plan, organize and deploy a complex peace operation.

African regional organizations, on the other hand, seem to be more ready and willing to undertake stabilization operations, especially when they have been involved in brokering a ceasefire, and feel obliged to build on that momentum. However, although the AU and some of the RECs are capable of deploying military forces, they generally lack the staying power and multi-dimensional capability of the UN.

It is anticipated that this pattern of sequencing will continue into the mid- to longer term. It will be very useful for all concerned, however, if this unofficial division of labour could be formalised through some form of cooperation agreement between the UN and the AU, as this would then enable us to conduct a much more focussed capacity-building effort.

Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since the OAU was founded in 1963. Many of the new structures, however, still need to become fully operational.

One of the most significant shortcomings of the AU is the lack of institutional capacity, especially the human resources, to adequately develop policy, and plan and manage peace operations. The AU has only a handful of staff dedicated to managing peace operations, significantly less than its UN and EU counterparts. It would be important for donors interested in investing in African peacekeeping capacity to understand that the investment in training and equipping peacekeepers will be unsustainable if it is not matched by a proportionate investment in developing an appropriate headquarter capacity.

One of the most significant developments in the African peacekeeping context is the initiative to develop an African Stand-

by Force (ASF). It is significant because, for the first time, Africa now has a common position, and action plan, for the development of its peacekeeping capacity. This means that the various disparate donor initiatives to enhance Africa's peacekeeping capacity can be positively channelled to support one cohesive effort.

Although considerable progress has been achieved since the ASF concept was approved in 2004, the operationalisation of the ASF has been slower than anticipated, and has been predominantly focussed on the military aspects of peace operations. One of the key remaining challenges is the need to equally develop the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF framework so that the multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU peacekeeping concept.

The single most important factor when considering the future of peacekeeping in Africa is financing. The AU experience is that even relatively small unarmed military observer missions have proved too costly to be financed solely from its own budget or from the African Peace Fund. Instead the AU, and the OAU before it, has to rely on donor funding to finance its peace missions.¹¹

The AU's first peace operation, AMIB, had an approved strength of just over 3,000 troops and an operational budget of approximately \$130 million per year. This was a significant expense in the African context, if we consider that the budget of the AU Commission for 2003 was approximately \$32 million in comparison.

The AU's second peace operation, AMIS, is even larger still with approximately 6700 personnel and an annual budget of approximately \$466 million. AMIS is also donor funded, and as indicated earlier, the EU and the USA have contributed the bulk of the missions' budget.

As can be seen from these two examples, it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, the AU will be dependent on donor support for its peace operations. This is problematic because the AU's dependency on external resources denies it the freedom to independently take decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it may wish to undertake. Finding the appropriate balance between African and partner interests will thus probably be the dominant feature of the relations between these partners over the short- to medium-term.

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¹ This paper will use the term 'peacekeeping' operations in its generic form, i.e. to refer to the whole spectrum of operations (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) authorized by the United Nations to monitor ceasefire agreements and/or to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, including those aspects of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction that fall within the domain of the UN's new integrated missions concept.

² All the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations statistics in this paper were calculated using the DPKO Background Note of 30 April 2006, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>, accessed on 20 May 2006.

³ For AMIS statistics see ACCORD's Conflict Trends magazine Issue 4/2005, http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2005-4/ct4_2005_pgs52_53.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2006. For AMIB see Festus Aboagye's "The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation", in *Conflict Trends*, Issue 2/2004, http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2004-2/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2006.

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⁵ The top 10 troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations as of April 2006 were: (1) Bangladesh – 10,288; (2) Pakistan – 9,431; (3) India – 9,057; (4) Jordan – 3,648; (5) Nepal – 3,523; (6) Ethiopia – 2,760; (7) Ghana – 2,561; (8) Nigeria – 2,446; (9) Uruguay – 2,441; and (10) South Africa – 2,012. See DPKO Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations as of 30 April, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/apr06_2.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2006.

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¹⁰ See Victoria K. Holt, "The Military and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capacities" in Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmar, *Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, HPG Report 21, March 2006 (www.odihpn.org)

¹¹ See African Union, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee* (Part I1 - Annexes), 12-14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MS/2(1); a copy can be found at http://www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/aurep.htm, accessed on 25 May 2006.

From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding¹

Espen Barth Eide

The Fall and Rise of Blue Helmet Peacekeeping

Ten years ago, international peacekeeping was predominantly UN and “blue helmet”. Back in 1995, we witnessed some major successes (Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique) – but also major failures (Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica) – in the early, post-Cold War phase of “2nd generation” peacekeeping. Since 1995, we have seen the fall and rise of blue helmet peacekeeping. In the second half of the 1990s, UN peacekeeping fell from around 80,000 to 12,000 troops, and most of us changed the focus from the UN to regional organisations – like NATO, the EU, ECOWAS and the African Union. This tide has changed, however, and since 2004, the UN has once again been the main multilateral actor in the field of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Within a short space of time, we will again have around 80,000 personnel in 15 peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN.

It should be noted, however, that while countries like ours were among the main contributors in the old days, it is now predominantly countries from the South that make up the bulk of the troop commitments to peacekeeping. At present we have to admit that Norway has an “all-time-low” military participation in UN operations, with only some 70 staff officers and observers in different missions. This is in direct contradiction to the fact that the UN is currently running an “all-time high” number of peacekeeping operations. Most of our military commitments abroad are committed through NATO (predominantly the approximate 500 we have in ISAF in Afghanistan) and in far smaller numbers through the EU.



UN Peacekeeping Missions, source: www.un.org

This kind of mismatch between global developments and our own contributions is not unique to Norway, but rather the rule for most western countries. This is unfortunate, as most of us share the view that the reforms suggested in the crucially important Brahimi report are essential to avoid future operational failures like the one we witnessed in the early 1990s. I am of course thinking of inexcusable tragedies like the ones in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995. I think we can agree that the reforms suggested were well substantiated and necessary, and the report received massive support when delivered.

Since 1995, we have also witnessed the emergence of an increasing understanding of the long-term nature of complex peacebuilding tasks. Very much as a result of both the lessons learned in the early 1990s, and the Brahimi report, we see a much more proactive and far-sighted UN today compared to just five

years ago. With an increased focus on a holistic approach, UN peacekeeping has actually scored a number of strategic successes over the last few years: a free and independent East Timor, consolidation of the peace in Sierra Leone, and the first peaceful transition in Burundi's history, to name but a few. Likewise, the UN and NATO have overseen the installation of a democratic government and the ratification of a constitution in Afghanistan after two decades of war and autocracy. In Liberia a successful election has been held, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo the UN forces have gained great respect through robust offensive operations against rebel groups. No conflict has claimed more lives since the Second World War than the long-lasting war in the DRC. The fact that genuinely democratic elections were held in its entire territory on July 31 is yet another tribute to the UN's increased ability to foster transition in deep-rooted conflicts.

However, there is still work to be done regarding the reform process, and in some areas the progress has been rather slow. The Norwegian government therefore believes that increased military participation and burden-sharing in peace operations is a prerequisite in order to influence both the pace and the results of the ongoing reform process. There is a limit to how interesting we will remain to other actors if we continue to stay on the outside criticising those actually shouldering the World Body's burden. If we are on the inside, we can speak with greater resonance, and that is exactly what we are aiming at.

The new Norwegian government declared in its Government platform that it will increase its contribution to UN peacekeeping. We are actively preparing to contribute to a possible new and robust UN peacekeeping force to underpin the peace process in Darfur, Sudan, which we hope will be deployed towards the end of this year. When, and if, a Darfur force is in place, our commitment will be around 200 troops, preferably in conjunction with troops from other Nordic and like-minded countries.

That said, let me underline that the prospect of influence is, of course, not the only nor even the primary motivation for my government's increased interest in the UN. We also firmly believe that our own national interests are best served by a world order based on human rights, international law, and social and economic development. As we see it, the UN, commanding the whole range of necessary means, is the only actor able to ensure

such a world order. In addition, the UN has a monopoly to legitimize use of force beyond self-defence, and Security Council resolutions in general receive wide international acceptance. Contrary to the expectations of some, recent international developments like the skirmishes surrounding the Iraq war have, in fact, further underlined the value of clear multilateral rules and the paramount role of the UN.

The New, Comprehensive Approach to Peacekeeping – and its Problems

The objectives of peacekeeping operations have often evolved from just maintaining a *status quo* to a far more ambitious approach of *managing change*. A peacekeeping force is no longer the solitary or even autocratic actor in the field, but rather one actor among a wide range of organisations providing humanitarian aid, reconstruction, reforms, institution building and so on. All these actors are increasingly dependent on each other. Hence, the UN is seeking involvement in the whole spectrum of activities linked to crisis management and nation building.

Other organisations like the EU, the AU and NATO are also broadening their approach to peacebuilding. The EU, too, has precisely the multifaceted nature that is needed to take an integrated approach to peacebuilding. The EU's challenge, however, is to get its act together to reap this potential synergy. I wish the Finnish presidency every success in steering the Union in that direction.

While a predominantly politico-military organisation, NATO is also trying to adapt to this new reality. NATO's operation in Afghanistan is one of the best examples with its "Provincial Reconstruction Team", or PRT concept. Afghanistan was, after decades of war and misrule, a typical example of a failed state. Military force alone is only part of the solution to re-build such a state, and has to be integrated into a larger, comprehensive setting. The PRT concept consists of a range of closely orchestrated military and civil elements, and is as such an effective instrument for the support of local authorities. Although it is important to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian and military activities, it is vital that we improve our ability to coordinate these activities in complex peace operations in order to increase their overall effect.

In this respect the UN is still a rather unique organisation which, unlike most others, actually has access to the whole range of crisis management tools. Multifunctional UN operations extend from stabilisation and protection, to humanitarian aid, organising elections, security sector reforms, economic support, and so on. In other words, all measures necessary to build a state and ensure lasting peace.

This evolution is necessary, and reflects the typical crisis scenarios of our time. Previous conflicts and crises were usually the result of armed conflict or war between states. Today, however, stabilising and rebuilding failed states, or states in distress, has become one of the major challenges to the international community. These states are often recognised by their total lack of social and security institutions, internal conflicts, and very often deliberate violence against the civilian population. As a result, the international community no longer faces only a military conflict, but a whole range of challenges, often including a humanitarian crisis beyond belief. It has become evident that military means and traditional “blue helmets” only provide part of the solution, and that something more than “keeping the peace” has to be done to facilitate conflict resolution.

In the Ministry of Defence we are acutely aware that while there are several conflicts in the world that require international military contributions in order to get the peace process on track, there is no place where the military can do this job on its own.

Building lasting peace is a very different and often more challenging task than just neutralizing an enemy in a war. The success of a typical contemporary mission of rebuilding failed states therefore depends on the success of the overall efforts of all parties involved. As the UN traditionally has been the leading organisation in peacekeeping, and also possesses a range of different means, it has done much to keep pace with the evolution.

A series of measures have been taken, starting with the Secretary-General report *Reviewing the UN – a program for reform* of 1997. In this report the Secretary-General for the first time expressed the need for an overall authority over all UN entities in field operations. Such measures have later been echoed in several reports, such as the aforementioned Brahimi report, and again in the 2005 report by the Secretary-General, *In larger freedom*. While the SG report of 1997 expressed the need for an

overall authority, the Brahimi report did not refer to integration as such, but stressed the importance of integrated planning. The SG report of 2005 emphasised that system-wide integration should remain a key objective in the field of planning and execution of UN operations.

The report also expressed the interdependence of security and development by stating: “Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other. [...] While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to ‘cause’ civil war, terrorism or organised crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence.” This security-development nexus, linking the lack of development and human rights with the lack of security, further underlines the need for a comprehensive approach. Inevitably, it also forces us to re-think how we maintain our national security.

In my view, the initiatives called for in the three reports mentioned are indeed necessary to meet the challenges of failed states, where building lasting peace should be the overall goal. Such challenges can only be met with a comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach is also an absolute prerequisite to cover the three key functions of what we might call peacebuilding: to establish stability and security, to protect and help civilians, and to build a foundation for long-term development and democracy.

These three key functions make up a triangular relationship, each depending on the others. It is difficult, or sometimes even impossible, for the “soft” parts of an operation to gain access to civilians with their humanitarian assistance without the “hard” parts providing security. On the other hand, military force alone does not feed, heal or educate civilians, as humanitarian aid alone does not provide security or build democracies.

I saw this quite clearly during my recent visit to Sudan. In southern Sudan there is a growing dissatisfaction among the population, since their expectations for rapid social and economic development have obviously not been met by the presence of UN peacekeepers alone. A peacekeeping force is, of course, very visible, and tends to raise the expectations of the population to an unrealistic level. It therefore needs to be backed by the necessary civilian agencies. On the other hand, in Darfur, UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs are not able to reach all those in need of help because of the lack of security.

But this triangular relationship in peacebuilding is also one of the challenges, or even dilemmas, of integrated missions – reconciling “partiality” with “impartiality”. On the security and nation building side one often has to be politically and militarily “partial”, while on the humanitarian side there is a need to maintain a clear distinction between the role and functions of humanitarian actors and that of the military, political and long-term development activities.



Figure 1: Framing the issue

Another dilemma of a comprehensive approach is that of local ownership. Especially when dealing with failed states, there is a challenge in engaging host governments effectively, and at the same time pushing for positive changes. The lack of capacity in national government ministries often makes international actors work independently, undermining the transition process more than supporting it as time passes. Overcoming this problem calls for patience and a long-term approach.

Long-term Visions: the Promise of the Peacebuilding Commission

To meet these challenges, there is a need for a holistic approach both in the planning and the execution of peacebuilding missions. Close cooperation and coordination by all agencies involved should be guided by a common long-term strategic vision that both describes the desired end state and defines the actions necessary to achieve this. Plans must ensure that all resources and activities are brought together and applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors. The challenge in this respect will be to define the “centre of gravity”, or the decisive parameters that must be influenced to make all other efforts work.

Strategic visions and centres of gravity have to be mission-specific, as one mission may have to concentrate on assisting the formation of a new government, while another may have to concentrate on the implementation of a peace agreement. There is no fixed model for integrated or comprehensive operations, and the form of a mission should follow the functions that are needed to influence the centre of gravity and reach the defined end state.

As already mentioned, a great deal has been done to reform and strengthen the UN over recent years, and to make the organisation ready and able to meet the security challenges of our century. However, work still has to be done, and one of the most important initiatives set forth by the Secretary-General is still to come. Just before Christmas last year, the General Assembly and the Security Council approved the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to be supported by a new Peacebuilding Support Office set up in the Secretariat.

While we have not yet seen what the Peacebuilding Commission is able to do, and while several procedural issues are yet to be addressed, I remain hopeful that this body will live up to the crucially important job it is tasked with. It is potentially a real answer to a very real challenge: how do we make sure that the international community stays focused on a conflict once the guns are silenced and the political and media attention has shifted elsewhere, and how do we make sure that the long-term peacebuilding effort that is to follow short-term crisis management remains strategic, focused and sustainable.

I am of course particularly pleased that Norway will be one of the members for the first two years. With the Peacebuilding Commission, the UN will finally have an intergovernmental body responsible for the overall coordination of post-conflict and peacebuilding activities. The Commission will not only provide a forum for internal coordination of planning and execution of peace operations, but also a forum for coordination of the activities of donors, troop contributors, and other international organisations and institutions.

Likewise, with the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Secretariat of the UN will finally have a body dedicated to the overarching strategic thinking in the planning process and overall coordination inside and outside of the UN. The news that Carolyn McAskie, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi and an experienced development and humanitarian official, has been appointed as the new Assistant Secretary General in charge of this new unit suggests that this body will be given real authority within the complex structure of the UN.

One of the purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission will thus be to coordinate the activities of all actors on the international peacebuilding scene. It goes without saying that a comprehensive approach cannot be limited to the UN alone. It also has to include the successful integration of all other actors, like other international institutions, regional organisations, donor nations, NGOs, local authorities, and so on. The list of actors in the business of peace, security and humanitarian aid is extensive, and probably growing.

Regional organisations like NATO, the EU and AU are all adapting to the new security environment and challenges in a similar way to the UN. The UN's "Integrated missions" and NATO's "Concerted planning and action" are both part of the attempts to respond to the challenges of peacebuilding. The EU is also aiming at a broader approach and greater responsibility for peace and security, both in Europe and globally. With its broad spectrum of economic, political and military assets, the EU is well placed to take on all the challenges of peacebuilding.

The establishment of EU Battle Groups, with one of their ambitions being to help increase the UN's crisis management capability, must also be mentioned as a part of the development of peacebuilding. I think the increased number of crises,

humanitarian disasters and states in distress will eventually increase the demand for 'hybrid operations' – operations mandated by the UN but executed by regional organisation. To succeed, such operations need a comprehensive approach, coordinated and planned not in isolation, but in close co-operation between the parties involved. In this respect I firmly believe the Peacebuilding Commission, when established, will be able to play a vital and important role.

By way of conclusion, I think the challenges of this century, and hence our new approach to security thinking, call for multidimensional, global and long-term commitments – commitments that have to be coordinated and tailor-made to fit each situation. If we succeed in addressing these challenges, I think what we might call "peacebuilding operations" will be the rule rather than the exception.

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¹ State Secretary Eide commenced his presentation in the seminar by congratulating Finland on its first 50 years of peacekeeping. He noted that Finland has been a very dedicated participant in UN and UN-mandated peace operations for five decades, often in close cooperation with its Nordic neighbours.

DO YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE?

For those wishing to learn more, the following list provides examples of both the work of the authors of this report and related documents:

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