UKRAINE AND ITS REGIONS

SOCIETAL TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Ryhor Nizhnikau, Arkady Moshes (eds.)
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Euromaidan – also known as the Revolution of Dignity – and the de-facto war with Russia changed Ukrainian politics and society. The brutal attacks and the killing of dozens of protesters in winter 2013–14, the collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime in February, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March and its covert intervention in Donbas in summer 2014 had a profound impact on self-identification and attitudes within Ukrainian society.

Prior to the Euromaidan Revolution, a weak national identity was considered to be one of the main challenges to successful state- and nation-building in Ukraine. Identity divisions impeded the formation of a modern state and caused constant oscillations between Russia and the West. Even though scholars debated the salience of different factors (ethnicity, language, values and ideology) and the extent of their impact, a consensus was forged as to the existence of major cleavages. Eventually, these divisive lines were skillfully manipulated, which facilitated Russia’s intervention.

Euromaidan and the conflict with Russia affected Ukrainians’ ethnic, linguistic and geopolitical identifications and reinvigorated nation-building. Previously highly divisive identity issues – such as the status of the Russian language, for example – became less sensitive. As a result, several political projects, which were built on an appeal to identities, such as the nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) and the pro-Russian Communist Party, collapsed. The presidential campaign of 2019 served to re-confirm the ongoing identity shifts. The incumbent, Petro Poroshenko, failed to rally sufficient support behind an identity-based “Army. Language. Faith” campaign, whereas his ethnically Jewish and
Russian-speaking opponent, Volodymyr Zelensky, won a landslide victory under vague slogans of unity.

Several studies have dealt with these shifts and analyzed their implications. Prior to 2014, accounts identified ethno-linguistic cleavages as a crucial dividing line, and subsequently focused on major competing ethno-linguistic identities – namely, ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic/Russophone and their mixed forms – shaped around language use/identity and nationality.1 Ethnic accounts were confronted with studies of civic Ukrainian nationalism, offering a more inclusive concept.2 Yet the civic identification with the Ukrainian state remained weak, partially due to state inefficiency.

After Euromaidan, analysts3 recorded that the national identity became more salient and unified, indicating the “birth of a political nation” in a “more Ukrainian” Ukraine.4 Two major findings support this claim. On the one hand, ethnic cleavages were softened, to a large extent due to a sharp weakening of Russian identity. A bottom–up de–Russification process resulted in the transformation of Russian speakers’ identity from Soviet to Ukrainian, even though the language practice was preserved.5 On the other hand, a rise in civic identity was witnessed,6 including an increase in the identification of Ukraine as the “homeland”? and the bottom–up forging and strengthening of civic identity in 2017–2018.8

Yet the civic–ethnic debates were challenged by studies of a value divide between “European” and post–/neo–Soviet “East Slavonic” in

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3 See, for example, the special issue “Identity Politics in Times of Crisis: Ukraine as a Critical Case”. Post–Soviet Affairs 34 (2–3).


particular. After Euromaidan, while acknowledging societal shifts, studies pointed to the persistence of previous value divisions, as well as the emergence of new value divides between age, education and language groups. Similarly, it was pointed out that ethno-linguistic and civic factors do not fully explain the persisting regional and local differentiations and the existence of spatial cleavages in the country, which challenge the nation-state paradigm and also highlight the importance of individual regions.

The impact of identity factors on politics has also been reconsidered. Traditionally, identity divides drove political competition, affected foreign policy preferences and served as a key structural constraint. Regional “East–West”, “blue–orange” (the colours of the opposing sides during the 2004 Orange revolution), and “EU–Russia” political splits dominated Ukraine’s national politics until 2014. The identity-building projects had a considerable effect on the consolidation of statehood and regime type, attitudes towards reforms and trust in institutions, civil society and popular mobilization, and potentially had a stronger effect than education, age, urban/rural and economic status. Divided identity impeded the formation of a coherent and unified foreign policy and caused

16 Shulman 2005, op. cit.
17 Onuch, O. 2014. Who were the protesters? Journal of Democracy 25(3).
18 Shulman 2005, op. cit.
inertia in Ukrainian foreign policy, which was further aggravated by the competing EU and Russian integration projects in the region.\textsuperscript{19}

After 2014, studies reaffirmed that identity had retained its impact on people’s political attitudes and foreign policy preferences.\textsuperscript{20} Importantly, a wide range of studies underlined that regional belonging affects political and foreign policy preferences and choices.\textsuperscript{21} In Ukraine’s regions, national identity and foreign policy preferences are increasingly conflated with distinct geopolitical identities, but are also interrelated with socio-economic factors, demography, attitudes or trade relations.\textsuperscript{22}

This report takes stock of the identity changes that took place in Ukraine over a period of six years following the Euromaidan Revolution. It seeks to examine the shifting self-identifications and attitudes both nationwide and in three major oblasts, namely Lviv, Kharkiv and Odesa, representing in this study the western, eastern and southern regions of the country respectively, to identify new differences and unity points. To this end, the paper focuses on two major issues: identity shifts and their political and foreign policy effects. First, the paper looks at the dynamics nationwide and in the three mentioned regions, and identifies the impact on people’s attitudes. The authors seek to explore how the Ukrainian identity has evolved, which of its multiple divisions have remained in place, which new ones have emerged, and how they resonate with each other. Second, the question of the political and foreign policy implications of these shifts is addressed.

The rationale underlying the regional focus is threefold. First, regionalism has been an important factor in Ukrainian politics. Ethno-linguistic, ideological and geopolitical divisions have traditionally had a visible regional pattern. These cleavages largely emerged along geographical and historical lines and, in simplified terms, split the country between the “pro-Russian”/“post-Soviet” East and the “pro-European”/“nationalist” West, placing Russian-speaking but “Western”-voting Kyiv in between.

Second, the identity shifts coincide with a realignment of centre-periphery relations within the context of the ongoing reforms, particularly decentralization. Taking the regional aspect into consideration furthers


\textsuperscript{20} Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2018, op. cit.


understanding of the potential risks – or lack thereof – of this process for the Ukrainian state.

Third, while the literature has paid significant attention to developments at the national level, the regions – with the exception of studies on Donbas23 – have been under-researched both outside and inside the country.

This Report does not aim to engage in theoretical and methodological debates on the definition of identity and its measurement, but attempts instead to provide an overview of recent dynamics. It consists of four chapters. In the first, Mariia Zolkina focuses on the national level and discusses the major changes in Ukrainians’ self-perception and foreign policy orientations countrywide. Mykola Riabchuk covers the developments in the Lviv region, deconstructing the notion of “West Ukrainian” nationalism, its specific manifestations in Lviv, and its impact on people’s behaviour and value systems. Tetiana Kryvosheia and Oksana Lychkovska-Nebot concentrate on attitude shifts in Odesa, showing how previous Maidan/anti-Maidan divisions have been overtaken by new value-based cleavages. Lastly, Oleksandr Fisun and Anton Avksentiev deal with the effects of these shifts in Kharkiv on both electoral preferences and local politics. The concluding section summarizes the main findings with regard to the impact of identity shifts on Ukrainian politics and society as well as regional diversity.

1. THE SHIFT AND TRENDS IN UKRAINIANS’ SELF-PERCEPTION AND FOREIGN PRIORITIES AT THE TIME OF RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT
Mariia Zolkina

The period from 2014 to 2019 was marked in Ukrainian socio-political life not only by Russian aggression, the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the need to deal with the complex effects of the conflict, but also by fundamental changes in public opinion. Two areas demonstrating the most significant long-term consequences are the socio-political identification within society and foreign policy priorities. Socio-political identification appears to be crucial as it contributes to the creation of a political nation, based on a common feeling of belonging to the same socio-political community. New trends both in self-identification and in foreign policy priorities are of fundamental value, as they demonstrate not occasional, but long-term shifts in the field of political culture (as it might influence the formation of a more proactive civil position), and the construction of a more coherent and conscious vision of the path of national development.

The rise of a “citizenship” identity, the weakening of the prevalence of regional self-identification over national identification on the one hand, and a qualitatively new approach towards the assessment of EU and NATO membership perspectives on the other, have together built up a new configuration in those areas where the internal divisions of Ukrainian society were evident before 2014. In particular, the choice between pro-European and pro-Eurasian vectors clearly divided Ukraine into two up to 2014. At the same time, these two parts differed from each other also in terms of a more “citizenship”-oriented identity in the West and the Centre, and a more visible “local”-oriented identity in the South and the East. This is why the changes that took place regarding these issues acquire fundamental significance.
SELF-IDENTIFICATION AFTER 2014: THE STRENGTHENING OF A CONSCIOUS “CITIZENSHIP” COMPONENT

Before 2014, the structure of Ukrainians’ self-identification included two basic features. One was the prevalence of nationwide political self-identification. Namely, 51% of the population considered themselves first and foremost citizens of Ukraine. In parallel with that, however, regional and local self-identification was widespread. Thirty-seven per cent of Ukrainians viewed themselves primarily as citizens of their region or local district. As a result, socio-political self-perceptions combined a rather strong association with local and regional identity with a strong citizenship identity all over the country, and in every macroregion.

The correlation between the two most widespread types of identity (national and regional/local) started shifting after 2014. For the most part, this was a public reaction to Euromaidan, Russia’s aggression, the change of political forces in power in Ukraine and new foreign policy priorities. Since 2014, two new trends in socio-political identification have been identified. Public opinion polls have demonstrated a significant increase in “citizenship” identity, whereas the regional identity has decreased.

Table 1. Who do you consider yourself to be first and foremost? (one answer) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resident of the region (of one oblast or several oblasts) where you live</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of Ukraine</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of the ethnosc, nation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of the former Soviet Union</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European citizen</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Citizen of the world”</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional self-identification dropped from 37% in 2013 to 24% in 2014, and dipped to an all-time low of 12% in 2015. Although it grew in 2018, the 2019 level of 16% was half of what it had been prior to 2014.

These changes were accompanied by fundamental shifts in national citizenship self-identification, which strengthened considerably. The most crucial gap between these two types of socio-political self-perception was found at the end of 2015, when 80% of the population considered themselves to be primarily citizens of Ukraine, while only 12% felt that they were primarily residents of their regions. Despite the fact that nationwide identity declined after 2015, in 2019 a new wave of positive dynamics was registered. These changes might be treated mainly as a logical development of the public mood, which reacted emotionally to the Revolution of Dignity and the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

An assessment of the real state of affairs in the field of public attitudes towards nationwide identity should be made not only by means of “direct” measurements of what people think, but also by studying how society perceives “related” issues. In other words, it is worth looking more precisely not only at the interrelation between nationwide and regional types of identity, but at public attitudes towards Ukrainian statehood and citizenship. In this field, we find significant changes both in the nationwide average and at the regional level.

In particular, in 2014–2019, there was a significant rise in support for the idea of the independence of Ukraine. According to 2016 data, if an independence referendum (as in 1991) had taken place, the number of those voting in favour of Ukraine’s independence would have reached 65% of all respondents, and 87% among those who intended to participate and were determined about their choice. In 2011, for instance, these results were 51.5% and 67% respectively. In 2019, support for the idea of confirming the independence of Ukraine intensified, reaching 71% among all respondents, mainly due to greater readiness to take part in such hypothetical voting.
Moreover, these changes attain even greater importance because they result from the shift in public opinion in the southern and eastern macro-regions of Ukraine, which are the most sceptical about state independence. In particular, in the South in 2011, such a hypothetical referendum would have been won by 53% against 47% voting ‘no’. In the East, only 53% would have voted ‘for’. In 2016, the ‘yes’ vote would have won by a huge margin: 78.5% to 21.5% in the South, and 71.5% to 28.5% in the East among those who would have definitely voted. This means that the transformation in public socio-political identity was accompanied by much deeper changes in public perceptions of Ukrainian statehood.

Consequently, significant shifts appeared in the field of people’s regional self-identification. In particular, in 2014 in Donbas, the most “region”-oriented part of Ukraine, regional socio-political identification as the primary attitude fell dramatically in comparison to 2013 (the poll was conducted on the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on July 10–29, 2014). In 2017, in the government-controlled part of Donbas, regional self-identification was chosen by only 8% of the local population, while 77% considered themselves to be first and foremost citizens of Ukraine.

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN PUBLIC OPINION:
OBVIOUS CHANGES AND HIDDEN RISKS

European vs. Eurasian vectors: Is society still divided?
Importantly, all of the above-mentioned changes have taken place alongside shifts in foreign policy orientations. Prior to 2014, foreign policy orientations had always served as a major dividing line in Ukrainian society. Although support for European integration rather than Eurasian integration has been prevalent in Ukraine since 2011 (the average was 42% in favour of EU membership and 32% in favour of entering the Russia-led Customs Union),29 this prevalence was not absolute and was complicated by a clear regional cleavage. Western and Central macroregions supported EU integration, whereas Southern and Eastern Ukraine supported membership of the Customs Union.

In spring 2014, public opinion reacted to a new reality in Ukraine–Russia relations, showing a dramatic decrease in support for the idea of close political and economic integration with Russia. In particular, the share of Customs Union membership adherents abruptly decreased by 15% (from 36% in December 2013 to 21% in May 2014).

Table 3. If you had to choose only one option, which union should Ukraine join in the future, in your opinion?30 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Union with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia, Belarus,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Kazakhstan</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither the EU, nor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Customs Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three important findings should be mentioned. First, disappointment with the Eurasian vector of integration continues to grow. The idea of strategic integration with Russia has lost the majority of its former adherents, and as of 2019 stabilized at the level of 13%. Second, this fall didn’t automatically translate into rising support for EU membership. Support


for the European vector reached a peak of 56–58% in 2017 and stabilized at 51–53% after that. This implies the emergence of a rather conscious and stable core of pro-European citizens, which could be enlarged not by new occasional developments, but mainly due to systemic work, tangible progress in Ukraine–EU relations, and concrete benefits that appear obvious to ordinary citizens. This statement is supported by research on public expectations in the case of hypothetical EU membership. Third, public disappointment with the Eurasian perspective has turned into widespread frustration concerning the choice between European and Eurasian vectors in general. As a result, the majority of pro-Russian supporters prefer “non-alignment” today. Together with the undecided respondents, this category increased from 28% in 2014 to a high of 38% in 2018.

**NATO membership: Qualitative changes in the nature of public perceptions**

Attitudes towards NATO are even more crucial. Before 2014, Ukrainian society was rather united in its negative attitude towards membership of the Alliance. The changes, therefore, are significant both quantitatively and qualitatively. Immediately after Crimea’s takeover by Russia, public opinion revealed a sharp increase in positive attitudes towards NATO as the best way to guarantee Ukraine’s national security. This increased from 12% in 2013 to 33% in May 2014 and rose to 46% of Ukrainians in 2019.

In turn, support for a military alliance with Russia has decreased by 18% since 2012. Non-block status, which was viewed as the best security guarantee prior to 2014, also recorded a crucial decrease in public support after the onset of the military conflict with Russia. However, in contrast to the stable negative public attitude towards military integration with Russia, the non-block status started to incrementally regain support, especially in the South and East of Ukraine.

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31 Ibid.

32 See also https://dif.org.ua/article/evropeyska-integratsiya-u-vimiri-gromadskoi-dumki.
This is a major risk. On the one hand, the strengthening of the non-block idea is evidence of poor understanding within a part of society about the lack of practical security guarantees this choice could provide. It means that stereotypes and myths about non-accession policy persist even after the failure of such a policy to prevent the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. On the other hand, a non-block status idea has been used in Russian political discourse to prevent Ukraine’s movement towards NATO. Since a political and military alliance with Russia and CIS countries seems to be impossible, Russian demands have shifted to an informal, de-facto rejection of Ukraine’s rapprochement with NATO.

Moreover, these “non-block” sentiments have clear regional roots, as they are widespread first of all in Ukraine’s South (62% think it is the best guarantee for the national security of Ukraine) and East (42% respectively). Thus, even an absolute majority of potential “yes” voters
in a hypothetical referendum on NATO accession would not be misleading. Regional differences still exist, even if both national and regional averages demonstrate the strengthening of support for NATO as the best option to ensure national security.

**Interdependence between socio-political self-identification and foreign policy priorities**

Prior to 2014, foreign policy priorities divided the country into two “camps” (West-East), and this was coupled with high regional self-identification in one of them, oriented at integration with Russia. That is why it is worth exploring whether people who demonstrate a certain type of self-identification tend to demonstrate a certain foreign policy preference as well.

This poll shows that regardless of which type of self-identification people choose, they demonstrate a pro-European choice, although this is more widespread among people who identify themselves first and foremost as citizens of Ukraine. Nevertheless, in 2018 the correlation between self-identification and foreign policy priorities grew stronger.

Table 5. Interrelation between socio-political self-identification and integration priorities (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who do you consider yourself to be first and foremost?</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resident of the region (one/ several oblasts) where you live</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of Ukraine</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In particular, as mentioned above, the general number of people who define themselves first and foremost as citizens of Ukraine decreased in 2018 in comparison to 2015 (from 81% to 67.5%), but at the same time the category with “citizenship” self-identification demonstrated higher support for integration with the EU than it did in 2015. Indeed, 58% of

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people were in favour of accession to the EU among those who chose “nationwide” identification in 2015. Three years later, 65% of those who were “first and foremost citizens of Ukraine” were already more favourably disposed towards EU membership. Although in both 2015 and 2018 people with “priority” regional self-identification also demonstrated an orientation towards the EU rather than the Customs Union, in this category of respondents there was no noticeable change in proportions. In contrast to 2015, in 2018 it was also possible to speak reasonably about respondents who were “undecided” as to their self-identification. It is evident that people who couldn’t define their socio-political identity were more likely to be undecided as to their foreign priorities as well. In 2018 the share of people who were not able to decide which integration vector Ukraine should choose was largest among people with “no choice” concerning their socio-political identity (42%). Respondents with “citizenship” self-identification, on the other hand, have always demonstrated a lower likelihood for being uncertain about foreign policy priorities.

CONCLUSIONS

Since 2014, the socio-political self-identification of the Ukrainian population has undergone significant changes. The main trend is the widening and strengthening of “citizenship” identity, resulting from an emotional reaction to the Revolution of Dignity and the Russian aggression that followed.

This trend has been accompanied by an incremental decrease in “regional” self-identification, which took place mainly in the previously most “regionally” oriented parts of Ukraine. Deeper analysis of other components of public attitudes towards Ukrainian statehood reveals a significant rise in public readiness to support the idea of Ukrainian independence as such. The latter contributes to the irreversibility and sustainability of the new state of affairs.

Along with this new approach towards self-perception, Ukrainian society has demonstrated tangible changes in foreign policy priorities. The former division of the country into pro-European and pro-Eurasian “camps” has largely disappeared since the onset of Russian aggression. Support for integration into the Customs Union has fallen dramatically. The idea of close political and economic integration into Russia-led international structures is no longer acceptable to the absolute majority. Nevertheless, this disappointment also led to an increase in the “non-accession” group of respondents who want Ukraine to belong neither to the EU nor to the Customs Union. The developments in 2014 fundamentally changed public attitudes to NATO and its role for Ukraine. Ever since
spring 2014, NATO membership has been perceived as the best option to guarantee the national security of Ukraine. Military alliance with Russia has faced the same dramatic drop as Customs Union membership. Nevertheless, these significant changes might be somewhat balanced by a latent risk, related to an incremental restoration of support for a non-block status and regional differences in support for NATO.

As regards the fundamental changes in the interrelation between self-identification and foreign policy priorities, it is feasible that there is no automatic and direct correlation between the socio-political self-perception of citizens and their views on foreign policy vectors. At the same time, pro-EU sentiments are definitely more widespread, with people considering themselves to be first and foremost citizens of Ukraine. This group tends to demonstrate a more conscious choice, regarding both self-identification and foreign policy priorities. In addition, significantly, people who are uncertain or undecided about their socio-political identity tend to be uncertain about the foreign policy choice between EU or Customs Union membership as well.
Lviv, with a population of about 750,000, is only the seventh largest city in Ukraine, but in the western part of the country it is the largest, at least three times bigger than any other city in the region. This endows Lviv informally with a metropolitan status – as the cultural, educational and, to a degree, economic and political centre of seven oblasts, loosely subsumed under the rubric “Western Ukraine”. In fact, Western Ukraine consists of four very different historical regions (Galicia, Volyn, Bukovyna, and Transcarpatia), quite distinct but sharing an important historical commonality. None of them were incorporated into the Soviet Union until WWII. As a result, they did not internalize “Sovietness” to the degree achieved further east, and were more similar in this regard to the inhabitants of Poland, Hungary, or the Baltic states. Yet the most conspicuous feature that made Western Ukraine strikingly different from the rest of the country and, more generally, from Soviet “normalcy” in the eyes of any visitor from the east, was the predominance or at least the free use of Ukrainian in the urban environment.

In all other regions beyond the west, any use of Ukrainian in public was stigmatized as a sign of rural backwardness or, worse, as a defiant manifestation of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”. West Ukrainian cities embodied the latter – in popular beliefs, legends and anecdotes, but also in all kinds of Soviet propaganda. The guerilla resistance against the Soviets after WWII only strengthened the staunchly “nationalistic” image of the west Ukrainian region, with the city of Lviv placed naturally at the very centre of that myth.
The Russo-Ukrainian war and the ensuing civic mobilization have substantially changed the notion of “nationalism” in Ukraine. Back in 2005, only 27% of respondents in a nationwide poll saw it as an ideology that “aims primarily at the transformation of Ukraine into a strong state, with a high international reputation and decent level of citizens’ well-being”. As many as 41% assessed it negatively – as an ideology that “splits society into ethnic Ukrainians and ‘non-Ukrainians’ and strives to restrict the rights of the latter group”. In 2015, the same pollsters found the opposite: 47% defined nationalism positively, as a useful transformative force, and only 24% stood by the earlier negative view. Remarkably, the positive view of “nationalism” prevailed, albeit minimally, even in Ukraine’s East (38.4% vs. 37.7%) and Donbas (37.4% vs. 32.2%).

However, this did not impact the general perception of western Ukraine, and Lviv in particular, as the hotbed of Ukrainian “nationalism”, namely something exceptional – not necessarily negative but still abnormal. The cliché is particularly prevalent in the international media, which repeatedly refer to Ukraine’s “nationalistic West” as counterposed to the presumably “pro-Russian East”. In fact, the binary opposition is patently false insofar as the two key adjectives belong to different semantic fields and do not correspond. The implication is that being “pro-Russian” absolves a person from being “nationalistic”, while being “nationalistic” is a primordial and perhaps genetically determined feature of Ukraine’s West. The consequences of these mental shortcuts and semantic manipulations are dramatic since they facilitate many other distortions.

Nationalism is too charged and ambiguous a word to be used arbitrarily, especially in reports on a country about which most people know little, if anything at all. The primary goal of this chapter is to take a closer look at so-called “West Ukrainian” nationalism, its specific manifestations in the city of Lviv, its impact on people’s behaviour and value systems, their perception of other regions and self-perception within the country. To this end, the chapter draws on available sociological data, which are quite rich but come from different, often methodologically incompatible surveys. In most cases, they cover the whole region of West Ukraine, occasionally Galicia (the Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts), but very rarely Lviv itself. A modest extrapolation of the data is therefore needed if the entire region (Galicia or the whole Western Ukraine) is to serve as a rough sociological proxy for the city.

WHAT DO THE DATA SHOW?

The convenient use of Ukrainian in public might be the most conspicuous sign of “nationalism” in the city of Lviv in the eyes of visitors from the east, but it hardly appears so in the eyes of those who did not internalize the Soviet “normalcy” that deemed any public conversation in Ukrainian (beyond a village, bazaar or Writers’ Union) a deplorable deviation. Mass attachment to a native language is certainly not a unique West Ukrainian feature; it is quite typical of most nations. The surveys show that even in heavily Russified Eastern Ukraine, two-thirds of respondents claim Ukrainian as their “native language” and almost half speak it at home. But far fewer dare to use it in public – a clear sign of an unfriendly social environment that still supports and discursively reproduces a supremacist colonial convention. The West Ukrainians did not internalize it, so the region remains the only part of Ukraine where the number of urbanites speaking Ukrainian at home and in public is the same.38

This might be a sign of “nationalism” since any resistance to the dominant (imperial, in this case) convention requires some sort of “nationalistic” mobilization. But this is a rather defensive “nationalism” aimed at protection of its own “normalcy” against the imperial “normalcy” that deems all things Ukrainian inferior.

While the free use of Ukrainian in public is the most conspicuous feature that makes Lviv and other West Ukrainian cities notably different from their East Ukrainian counterparts, there are many more dissimilarities, less contrasting but statistically significant and variously exemplified by sociological surveys. Most of these are not necessarily evidence of “nationalism”, but certainly proof of a stronger national identity and greater concern about identity-related issues. For instance, as many as 86% of ‘Westerners’ declare themselves “patriots of Ukraine”, while the national average is 83%.39 By the same token, 89% of the respondents in Western Ukraine declare support for national independence (Ukraine’s average is 71%, with 20% undecided);40 65% declare that they are ready to take up arms to defend their country (the national average is 50%);41 72% identify themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine (the national

average is 65%); and 84% of respondents in the Lviv oblast are proud of being citizens of Ukraine (the national average is 69%).

The apparently stronger national identity of the region also determines its stronger pro-Western (primarily pro-EU and pro-NATO) orientation, as well as support for a set of values deemed “European” – democracy, liberalism, freedom of speech, a free market, and civic participation.

The differences between the Western and Eastern regions are not that marked, since all of them share a rather low East European political culture and, to a different degree, legacies of Sovietism. Nonetheless, they are statistically discernable and quite stable. The connection between identity (nationalism) and a pro-Western orientation (set of values) has been determined by a peculiar development of the Ukrainian national project since its very inception in the first half of the 19th century. The main challenge for Ukrainian nation-builders had been emancipation from the Russian empire, which did not recognize Ukrainians as a separate nationality. This made them turn to the West as the alternative embodiment of modernity to identify with, and to acquire much-needed symbolic and discursive resources to counter the imperial dominance. This rendered Ukrainians “Westernizers by default”: they either had to give up their nationalistic ambitions and blend into the greater Russian nation, or tame their nativist, deeply ingrained Slavic-Orthodox anti-Westernism and adopt the (unpalatable at times) Western cultural and political patterns.

The other interesting manifestation of the stronger national identity in Western Ukraine is the higher level of social optimism expressed by inhabitants of the region. As many as 87% of Westerners believe that Ukraine would overcome all problems and challenges (Ukraine’s average is 81%); 63% of Westerners believe Ukraine is developing in the right direction (16% claim the opposite, while the national average is 51% vs. 23%); 42% of Westerners believe there have been more positive than negative things since independence (10% claim the opposite, while the Ukrainian average is 26% vs. 23%); 39% of Westerners look to the future with optimism and 57% with hope (Ukraine’s average is 36% and 56%
respectively);\(^48\) 78% of respondents in the Lviv oblast feel happy or rather happy (Ukraine’s average is 70%).\(^49\)

Even though Western Ukraine is the poorest part of the country (in terms of average salaries, personal income, and regional GDP per capita),\(^50\) most respondents consider themselves “middle class”, and assess the financial situation of their families as being much better than respondents in other oblasts. In the city of Lviv, only 6% of respondents claim that they do not have enough money for food, and only 14% contend that they can barely afford anything besides the most basic items (both figures are among the lowest in Ukraine). Three quarters of the inhabitants of Lviv (75% – the highest number in Ukraine) fall into the middle income category, claiming they have enough money for food, clothes, shoes and other basic items, but need to save or borrow money to purchase more expensive things. Neither income from the shadow economy nor remittances from abroad can explain this paradox, especially if we take into account the respective data from Kyiv (64% – a city which is much better-off, with average salaries almost three times higher than in Lviv).\(^51\)

As in the case of the higher social optimism, the patriotic mobilization might be the main reason for an apparently exaggerated assessment of personal well-being in Lviv and elsewhere in Western Ukraine. All these data do not say much about the stronger “nationalism” of Western Ukraine but rather confirm the higher level of patriotism of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians who make up the absolute majority in the region. In ethnic terms, Ukrainians make up 95% of the population of Western Ukraine (in Donbas they make up only 69%, and 89% in the South and East); in linguistic terms, 93% claim Ukrainian as their native language while the national average is only 60% (84% in the Centre, 42% in the South, 36% in the East, and 27% in Donbas).\(^52\) This does not mean that Ukrainian Russians or Russian-speakers are hostile or completely alien vis-à-vis Ukraine, but they are much more likely, for obvious reasons, to have mixed cultural and sometimes political loyalties vis-à-vis Russia as a kin state. This, in turn, increases the probability of a looser attachment to all things Ukrainian and of a more ambivalent and hesitant stance on some sensitive political issues.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF “OTHERNESS”

Decoupling patriotism from nationalism is not an easy task until and unless the latter takes an aggressive stance against local minorities and/or outside groups or nations. In all other respects such as strength or salience of national identity or its supremacy over other identities the person possesses, they are virtually indistinguishable.

One of the ways to uncover the potentially dangerous features of local nationalism is to measure the level of xenophobia. In this regard, the nationwide surveys carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIIS) does not bode well for Western Ukrainians. The region scored 4.7 on the Bogardus seven-point scale, while the national average appeared to be 4.2 and the lowest score of 3.6 was found in Ukraine’s South.53

Research conducted by the Razumkov Center seems to confirm the KIIIS results, even though it employed a different measurement.54 The pollsters asked the respondents to list members of the ethnic group that they would like to have as neighbours and, separately, to list those whom they would not like to have living nearby. Again, the Western Ukrainians appeared to be the least tolerant, with only 39% claiming that the ethnicity of their neighbours does not matter (the national average was 53%), while 44% of the Westerners expressed their preference for an ethnically Ukrainian neighbourhood (the national average was 29%). Among the least desirable neighbours, Roma predictably featured most strongly, with the highest negative result of 41% in the West (the nationwide average was 32%). Russians came second, seen negatively by 30% of the Western Ukrainians (the national average was 13%). While the negative othering of Roma is rather a typical phenomenon throughout Central and Eastern Europe, specifically in areas where Roma are concentrated,55 the pronouncedly negative attitude towards Russians is a relatively new phenomenon, indicating fairly strong disapproval of the politics of the Russian state rather than a true ethnic bias.56

As for other minorities, West Ukrainians are slightly more inclined than Easterners to place them on the negative list as undesirable neighbours, but also, paradoxically, more willing to place them on the positive list of preferable neighbours (e.g. 4% of Westerners would not like to have Poles as their neighbours but 28% would, while the national average is respectively

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The paradox probably stems from the fact that minorities are concentrated primarily in the West and are much more conspicuous and ethnically noticeable there than in the East. This probably makes Westerners’ attitudes towards minorities more concrete, based on personal experience, and therefore more differentiated. They might be more positively or more negatively disposed but, in any case, less indifferent.

In the East, the minorities are pure abstractions, ethnic in name only. In most cases, they are heavily Russified and virtually indistinguishable from the Russian-speaking majority. One may only speculate about the kind of attitude that Easterners might have towards ethnic neighbours if they were really different, beyond the tenets of Soviet “internationalism”. The subsequent study by the Razumkov Center sheds more light on the issue of regional tolerance by extending the list of (hypothetical) “undesirable neighbours” and attaching, for the purpose of comparison, the responses from several other countries. Remarkably, in all but one minor issue (that of religion), West Ukrainians appeared to be more tolerant than their compatriots from the East and, in most cases, than the respondents from Russia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions or countries/social groups</th>
<th>Western Ukraine</th>
<th>Eastern Ukraine</th>
<th>Ukraine in general</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug users</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholics</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with AIDS</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/guest workers</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racially different people</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with a different religion</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People speaking a different language</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried couples</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Razumkov Center 2017

The same study also provides interesting data on social trust in Ukraine, in some of its regions, and in several neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{59} Here again, West Ukrainians appear to be somewhat closer in their attitudes towards Poles and Germans than they are towards their Eastern compatriots and Russians. While the greater trust in neighbours or complete strangers probably accounts for the higher level of social capital, the greater level of trust in people of another religion/confession or ethnicity/nationality definitely indicates a lower level of ethnic/religious bias.

\textbf{Table 7. Regional and national responses to the question “How much would you trust (fully or partially) the following categories of people?” (%)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions or countries/categories of people</th>
<th>Western Ukraine</th>
<th>Eastern Ukraine</th>
<th>Ukraine in general</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in neighbours</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in people of different religions/confessions</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in people of different ethnicity</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in people you have never met before</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Razumkov Center 2017

The Razumkov Center data do not disprove the KIIS findings, which indicate Western Ukrainians’ rather considerable social distance from other ethnic groups along the Bogardus scale. But the data cast into doubt Eastern Ukrainians’ presumably shorter (as the KIIS study contends) distance vis-à-vis the same groups. The data actually reveal a substantially higher bias vis-à-vis \textit{real} otherness in the East than in the West. In Western Ukraine, “ethnicity” seems to be more meaningful and culturally significant than in the East, where it used to be a veritable declaration, enshrined in Soviet documents but devoid of any significant (non-Soviet/non-Russian) cultural markers.

This notion of “otherness” (and “our-ness”) was reflected in a peculiar way in another nationwide survey carried out in 2006 by the Razumkov Center, which asked respondents “In what way are inhabitants of different Ukrainian regions and of some neighbouring countries close to you in character, habits, and traditions?”. Predictably, Kyiv and Central

Ukraine were defined as closest to everybody, while Turkey, Hungary and Romania were cited as the most distant. Yet remarkably, West Ukraine was placed not only behind Russia but also behind Belarus – a country virtually unknown in Ukraine, and with very limited personal contact between citizens. It was recognized as “close” probably only because of a deeply internalized Soviet myth about the tripartite East Slavonic “brotherhood”, which also adds Belarus to the Russo-Ukrainian duo.

The 2016 survey posed a similar question (“How close to each other are the inhabitants of different regions in their cultures, traditions, and views?”) and revealed that the inhabitants of Galicia are seen as more distant from the inhabitants of Donbas than citizens of Ukraine are in general from citizens in the EU. This does not necessarily mean that the inhabitants of Galicia or West Ukraine are considered “worse”, or “hostile”. In actual fact, the 2015 nationwide survey presented a rather positive image of Western Ukrainians, as viewed by their co-citizens, who defined them primarily as “patriotic” (38%), “religious” (35%), “cultured” (28%), “committed to family values” (23%), “clever and educated” (16%), and “ready to help” (14.5%). The negative views gained much lower currency (respondents could mention up to three features). Six percent of respondents defined Galicians as “devious”, 5% as “aggressive”, 5% as “uncultured, uneducated”, and 2% as “lawless”. Unfortunately, no prior data exist with which to trace the changes, but they seem to be concomitant with the spread of positive connotations of “nationalism”. Nonetheless, the feeling of otherness seems to prevail: Galicians might be alright but they are not “like us”. They do not fit into the mythical matrix of the East Slavonic/Orthodox Christian imagined community.

THE BOTTOM LINE

All of the apparent differences between Ukraine’s regions and ethno-linguistic groups notwithstanding, they are gradually evolving in the same – pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western – direction in terms of their identities and political attitudes. This largely explains why Ukraine did not split under the external pressure – as was expected in Moscow and as often happens with truly divided societies.

63 See https://www.eurozine.com/emancipation–from-the-east-slavonic-ummah/.
Table 8. Support for national independence from Ukraine’s major ethnolinguistic groups as indicated by their answer to the question “If you had to choose now, would you support the declaration of Ukraine’s independence?” (Only the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses are shown in the table). (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Respondent’s native language</th>
<th>Ukrainian (yes/no)</th>
<th>Both Ukrainian and Russian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Overall in Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>60/16</td>
<td>43/30</td>
<td>23/45</td>
<td>56/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>77/17</td>
<td>54/35</td>
<td>35/48</td>
<td>61/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>91/5</td>
<td>71/15</td>
<td>45/30</td>
<td>76/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>89/7</td>
<td>78/15</td>
<td>73/19</td>
<td>82/12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: KIIS 2001; Rating Group 2013, 2014, 2019

The same dynamics can also be observed in different age groups: the younger the person, the more likely they are to be strongly pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian. All of this casts considerable doubt on the “exceptional” and “abnormal” status of Western Ukraine. The social dynamics imply a rather gradual “normalization” of the entire country, however painstaking, contradictory, and convoluted this may be. In any case, the higher level of patriotism and the strong, pre-eminent and salient national identity in Western Ukraine cannot be seen as evidence of “nationalism” (in negative terms), as long as they do not ostensibly equate with xenophobia and ethnic exclusiveness.

Western Ukrainians are not as tolerant as they could be, but their attitude towards all kinds of otherness does not differ substantially from their compatriots to the east or their neighbours to the west. Their support for far-right parties and candidates is lower than in most European states and is actually lower than in Eastern Ukraine, if we regard the mass support for the “Opposition Platform” (the former Party of Regions) at least partially as an expression of Putin-style Russian nationalism.

Finally, the proverbial West Ukrainian “nationalism” takes a rather inclusive view of the Ukrainian nation. Only 16% of respondents in the West define it in ethnic terms – as people of Ukrainian origin, regardless of where they live. Paradoxically, in Eastern Ukraine this view is shared by a substantially higher number (24%) of respondents. Both in the West (50%) and the East (52%), the majority opt for a civic definition of the Ukrainian nation – by citizenship.64 The only parameter in which the Westerners are more exclusive is native language. Twenty-eight per cent of them contend that ethnicity does not matter, but that a command of

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Ukrainian is a must. In the East, this figure is lower, at 17%. Then again, the underlying sentiment in this attitude is probably not so much to exclude “others” but rather to include them by enticing them to learn and use Ukrainian – a language that is still discursively stigmatized and marginalized in most urban centres.

Western Ukrainians in general, and the citizens of Lviv in particular, face a difficult dual task: to address their burdensome “nationalistic” image and to play the self-assigned role of the Ukrainian “Piedmont”, which is leading both the national revival and social modernization. The emphasis on the latter might be the key to successfully managing the former.
3. VALUE SHIFTS AND FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS IN SOUTH UKRAINE AND ODESA IN 2013–2019

Tetiana Kryvosheia, Oksana Lykovska-Nebot

Odesa, a Black Sea transport and cultural hub, traditionally attracted representatives of multiple nationalities, religions, and social classes. This diversity often sparked public conflicts and political confrontations, but also intensified economic and cultural development, which created the image of Odesa as an “exceptional” city defined by a “bizarre uprising against homogeneity, hostile to any efforts towards national construction”.65 In this sense, opportunities, in line with some opportunism, invention, resistance, and adaptability, are the unique features that define Odesa’s identity.

The Euromaidan Revolution with its universalistic ethos and democratic potential had a significant impact on Odesa. Having started in defence of the European choice, protests turned into a Revolution of Dignity, which accelerated modernization processes in Ukraine. However, although the Euromaidan Revolution has become a factor of further consolidation and self-identification for Ukrainian society, in Odesa Maidan was opposed by anti-Maidan, with its special and sometimes violent ethos.

This chapter explains the dynamics of the value shifts in Odesa and primarily argues that while the average Odesa inhabitant has moved closer to the national average on a number of previously divisive issues, a new divisive line – “old” vs “new” values – has emerged in the city and the country. The former is associated with paternalism and the desire for a strong hand, while the latter is coupled with the desire for change, including an aspiration for more participatory and democratic governance.

VALUE SHIFTS IN ODESA AFTER EUROMAIDAN

The Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine identified the value preferences of an “average” Ukrainian between late 2013 and early 2014, and again in 2018. Security ranked first in the hierarchy of value preferences in Ukraine, followed by benevolence, social equality, the well-being of all people and environmental protection. However, several regional differences stood out. The most significant differences concerned the values of participation in religious life, state independence and participation in political life. In both 2014 and 2018, there were noticeable differences between the Western and Central regions and the Southeast of Ukraine when it came to the first two values. Value indices for religious life and the independence of Ukraine indicated that these values were important in the West but were the least significant in the East and South. In contrast, in the South and Odesa, the most significant were the values of interesting work (4.27 in 2018 and 4.20 in 2014) and independence in affairs and judgments (4.12 in 2018 and 3.73 in 2014), while the least significant was participation in political life (2.82 in 2018 and 2.35 in 2014).

At the same time, in 2013–2018 “new” values such as personal freedom, independence of judgments, freedom of expression, the ability to participate in political decision-making and support for democracy gained in importance. The importance of the values of “state independence” (3.24 in 2014 to 4.18 in 2018) and “democratic development of the country” (3.39 to 4.06), “the possibility to express one’s opinion without fear” (3.39 to 4.05), “the possibility of criticism and democratic control over the decisions of the authorities” (3.27 to 4.04), and lastly, “independence in deeds, judgments and actions” (3.73 to 4.12) increased.

Furthermore, support for the national cultural revival and state independence of Ukraine also increased significantly (see Table 9). In addition, there was a steady trend towards the regional “value peculiarity” of Odesa, expressed in slightly higher importance, compared to other regions, of the values of entrepreneurial initiative, criticism of decisions made by the authorities, and personal freedom. Visible even before Euromaidan, this trend has strengthened significantly since 2014.

66 Calculated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is completely insignificant, and 5 is of great importance.
Table 9. Value shifts in Odesa in 2013–2018 (Scale 1 to 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Late 2013 to early 2014</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in religious life</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State independence of Ukraine</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The democratic development of Ukraine</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National cultural revival</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding cultural horizons, instilling cultural values</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for entrepreneurial initiative</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interesting job</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of criticism and democratic control over the decisions of power structures</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational improvement</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The opportunity to express thoughts on political issues without fear</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public acceptance</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence in deeds, judgments and actions</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sociological studies conducted in Odesa confirm these findings. For instance, in 2014, 45% of Odesa residents were ready to participate in solving the most important problems facing the city, which were identified as poor road conditions (54%), urban pollution (52%), substandard health services (47%), lack of jobs (37%), and a challenging criminal situation (34%). However, only 5% were ready to invest their money in addressing these problems. The readiness to participate was combined with deep distrust in the state. Fifty-four per cent of Odessa residents were inclined to trust only themselves and their closest friends and relatives. Seventy-four per cent believed that only they could improve their material situation and economic security, and only 17% and 14% relied on the government and the president of the country respectively. Yet about 44% of Odesa residents trusted various local commercial organizations to resolve local problems. A high level of self-organization can also be confirmed by the focus of Odesa residents on personal communication.

67 Kryvosheia T.I., Lychkovska O.R., and Yatvetska A.V. Studies of social and political attitudes of Odesa residents, Department of Sociology, Odesa I.I. Mechnikov National University in 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, using an interview questionnaire with a face-to-face technique, sample size – 1,000 respondents, limiting error – 3.6%.
(50%) in searching for information, as well as 29% who use different social networks, which are active agents of social activity and social participation today.

These trends persisted. In 2017, 49.3% of respondents replied to the question “What in your opinion can unite the Odesa residents today?” by saying that the most significant factors for them were “creating and maintaining high standards of living”, “urban improvement” (34%) and “creating enough jobs with decent pay” – (30.6%). In addition, 24.3% of respondents were ready to jointly support the idea of “the city revival”.

At the same time, the 2018 sociological studies demonstrated the intensification of contradictory trends and some disappointment with the post-revolutionary development of the country. On the one hand, 37% considered that life “had improved somewhat” in Odesa over the previous year, 10% that it “had significantly improved”, and 23% that it had “worsened”. On the other hand, Odesa residents indicated disappointment with the effect of Euromaidan on Ukraine. Forty-four per cent thought that Euromaidan had “definitely changed [Ukraine] for the worse” and a quarter indicated that Euromaidan had “changed [life] for the worse to some extent”. Only 10% indicated that “changes for the better” had occurred, while 13% did not recognize any changes.

In fact, the 2015 focus group studies of Odesa Maidan and anti-Maidan supporters revealed that both parties had many more commonalities than differences. The groups were still divided over the events of May 2, 2014, and attitudes towards ways of achieving their goals. Yet they shared similar goals, primarily personal well-being, Ukraine’s economic recovery, peace and security, a decent life for every citizen, and social security for the most vulnerable groups. Most respondents were ready for dialogue, but at the same time realized that positive changes would not occur soon.

The studies highlighted the persistent importance of local identity – precisely for the sake of Odesa, for the sake of a peaceful and stable life in the city; both sides were ready to unite as the “third force”. The unanimous opinion about the future of the city was that dialogue was possible and would serve to preserve Odesa as a peaceful Ukrainian city. Yet this was conditioned by a focus on the internal problems of the city and the expectation that political forces would not exploit the events of May 2.

Yet in 2018, support for federalization was low. Fifty per cent of respondents believed that the best option was “to keep the region a part of

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68 Forty-eight people died during large-scale clashes on the streets of the city, 42 of whom died in the fire in the House of Trade Unions. See more at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/turkev报17thRU.pdf.

unitary Ukraine”. Twenty-two per cent chose the answer “self-governing region as part of federal Ukraine”, 13% said that the best option was “the federation of regions of southeastern Ukraine”, while 8% believed that the Odesa region should be included in the Russian Federation.70

The importance of language divisions decreased. Neither Maidan nor anti-Maidan supporters in Odesa overestimated the personal significance of both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages. Furthermore, in contrast to the prevailing stereotype, representatives of the Odesa “anti-Maidan” unanimously believed that the state language should be Ukrainian, but the rights of citizens who spoke other languages should not be infringed. In general, the language issue was secondary to socio-economic concerns. According to one of the respondents, “If my state develops economically, there will be no language problem at all, and if I have to learn English for this, for example, it makes no difference to me”.

Despite some inconsistencies, however, Odesa residents as well as Ukrainians in general, have largely become more proactive and more prone to changes. Moreover, they are ready to make these changes by themselves. The trend was maintained in the presidential election in 2019: 87% (41% in the first round) of Odesa residents who voted for Volodymyr Zelensky duly wanted to express their readiness to break with the recent past and demonstrate positive expectations for the future.

FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS

After the Euromaidan Revolution, the annexation of Crimea and the onset of Russian aggression in Donbas, a significant reorientation of citizens towards the EU and a huge drop in support for Russia occurred across the country, including the South.

In the South in 2013, only 23.9% prioritized the development of relations with the EU, compared to 54.2% that prioritized relations with Russia. In 2015, 36.3% supported integration with the EU and 12.9% with Russia. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of respondents (27.7%) found it difficult to answer this question. In 2013, in answer to the question about a hypothetical referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the EU, 28.5% of residents in the South said they would answer “Yes”, and 58.7% “No”.71 In 2015, it was 41% for “Yes”, and 23% against, while 20% were undecided. At the same time, the relative majority (54%) in the South in

2015 did not consider European integration an idea that could unite all of the regions in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{72}

However, in 2019, significant changes occurred in respect of public opinion. In response to the question on Ukraine’s preferred integration direction, 44.4% chose the EU, 22.7% the Eurasian Union and, once again, a large group found it difficult to answer (32.9%).\textsuperscript{73} In 2020, the trend in support of European integration in the South of Ukraine was maintained: 51.5% said they would vote for EU accession, 14.9% that they would vote against it, while only 8.1% stated that they would not take part in the referendum.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Support for EU membership in the South (\%)}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
If a referendum were held in Ukraine on joining the European Union, how would you vote? & 2013 & 2015 & 2020 \\
\hline
For & 28.5 & 41 & 51.5 \\
Against & 58.7 & 23 & 14.9 \\
Would not participate & 9.2 & 15.4 & 8.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Support for different integration directions in the South (\%)}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
Which integration direction should Ukraine take? & 2013 & 2015 & 2019 \\
\hline
Develop relations with the EU & 23.9 & 36 & 44.4 \\
Develop relations with Russia & 54.2 & 12.9 & 22.7 \\
I don’t know & 11.8 & 27.7 & 32.9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Since 2014, the orientation towards NATO membership has been regarded in Ukrainian society as the best way to guarantee the national security of the country. In Odesa, between April 2012 and June 2017, the level of support for NATO grew from 7 to 20\%. It should also be mentioned that the growth of support for NATO membership occurred against the backdrop of disappointment with the idea of a non-aligned status and military alliance with Russia. Between April 2012 and June 2017, support for military union with Russia and other CIS countries dropped most significantly in the East (from 38\% to 13\%) and the South (from 31\% to


\textsuperscript{73} See http://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiolohichni-doslidzhennia/pidsumky2019–gromadska-dumka.

11%). However, 37% considered a non-aligned status as a way to ensure the security of Ukraine.

The South had no common understanding of what NATO would entail for Ukraine: 19% regarded NATO as a form of protection, 18% as a threat, while 25% saw the Alliance as neither a form of protection nor a threat, and 37% were non-committal about the issue. Only 12% were well aware of what NATO entailed, 55% knew something but deemed their knowledge inadequate, while 22% knew almost nothing. Self-assessment of NATO awareness was the same in all regions of the country.

The South adhered to a relatively moderate position: about half of the respondents preferred non-block status, and a plurality advocated finding ways to reconcile with Russia. Whereas almost half of the residents in the East wanted peace at any cost, and in the West and the Centre the vast majority of respondents were ready for peace only on terms acceptable to Ukrainian society, a considerable proportion of inhabitants in the South supported both the first and the second option.

The 2018–2019 sociological surveys confirmed the ambiguity of the geopolitical perspectives of Odesa residents. For example, if a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union had been held in May 2018, residents would have responded in the following way: 44.6% against joining the EU, 40.3% for joining, and 15.1% who would not vote.

If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO had been held in May 2018, the results would have been as follows: 53.7% would have voted against joining NATO, 26.6% would have voted for, and 19.8% would not have taken part. The results of the spring 2019 poll in Odesa and the region were as follows: 32% would have voted against joining NATO, 36% would have voted for, and 32% would either have refrained from voting, or found it difficult to answer.

**ODESA’S GEOPOLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN FOCUS**

The regional peculiarities of Odesa as a whole confirm the general trend, but it is still important to emphasize some features and differences that we have been able to identify in the focus-group studies. There was no ambiguity as far as Odesa residents were concerned when it came to the main culprit for maintaining the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. In 2018, 34.8% and 24.4% cited the “Ukrainian” and “Russian” authori-

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ties respectively, 14.8% “the former government of Ukraine”, and 9.1% and 2.5% “the USA” and “the European Union” respectively.78 At the same time, the respondents chose a European developmental path for Ukraine. In turn, Russia was seen as a “symbol of the past”. Citizens who, conditionally, chose Russia, effectively chose the illusion of stability and a return to the Soviet Union, “leaving everything as it was before, and not worse”.

The future of Ukraine in the EU was, above all, associated with freedom of movement, educational opportunities and human development. Moreover, the focus-group participants thought that it was possible to re-establish relations with Russia. “It is necessary to simply make a leap, to enter the EU and then we can build full-fledged relations with the Russian Federation – our neighbour with whom we have many links in terms of history, culture, and mentality”.

In general, the respondents agreed that the issue of joining NATO should only be resolved through a referendum. The main concerns were possible violations of positive expectations such as: “Ukraine will suffer financial losses”, “we are used as a territory and we will become a conflict zone because we have an under-reformed army”, “we will not join as long as there are unresolved issues like borders. And Crimea is not a resolved issue – Crimea, Donbas. Joining NATO in such a situation means a new war. So a referendum is the only way, but not now”. Some respondents considered NATO a threat to Russia. “In the long run, NATO’s goal is to destroy the Russian Federation just like the USSR. For many years, this goal has been veiled by the same programmes of cooperation and collective security. But after the provoked civil conflict in Ukraine and unsuccessful attempts to draw the Russian Federation into the war, the goal became obvious”. “Maybe Russia only wanted a weakened Ukraine. Or NATO to disarm first and then deploy its bases to put pressure on Russia, like their long-standing and previously disguised goal”. When responding to the question of what Ukraine’s foreign policy should be like, most of the respondents/focus-group participants concluded that Ukraine should maintain a neutral position vis-à-vis all countries and remain a non-aligned state, as all other strategies would lead to loss.

At the same time, despite the ambiguity and often contradictory foreign policy views of Odesa’s citizens, there was a steady shift in positions towards European integration and joining NATO.

CONCLUSION

Since 2014, new “watersheds” have emerged along the value lines in the Odesa region. The “old” values are represented in the mass consciousness by paternalistic sentiments, an unwillingness to build one’s own future and bear responsibility for it, and by putting too high expectations on the central and local authorities to provide specific benefits. This has stemmed from a desire for a strong government that will restore order, ensure peace and justice, and demonstrate sufficiently strong nostalgia for the past, including cultural-national sentiments.

The “new” values are associated with liberal democratic values, expressed through a desire for economic, political and cultural change. This new division became the focal point of the socio-political expectations and attitudes of the Odesa residents, which are generally comparable to those of the “average” Ukrainian. Since 2014, there has been evidence of a growing demand in Odesa for political transformation, changes to the political system, the eradication of corruption, and the establishment of the rule of law in order to create conditions for people to build not only their own lives, but also a new democratic country.

If we talk about the social characteristics of the electorate, the “old-new” vectors correlate with age, level of education, income, profession, and attitude to property, as well as such integral indicators as the degree of social activity in general, and the level of social inclusion. Hence, the younger, the more educated and more socially embedded a person is, the stronger the inclination for “new” values. The language of communication and regional affiliation in this respect are secondary. The 2014 in-depth focus-group studies with representatives of the Odesa Maidan and anti-Maidan showed that linguistic affiliation is nothing more than an “ideology”, “the tip of the iceberg” that hides other social problems.79

Odesa residents demonstrate considerable potential for self-organization and entrepreneurship, as well as the desire and ability to protect themselves and their rights. At the same time, distrust towards institutional structures is strong, while networks of informal contacts that help one overcome and “address problems” remain. This trend reveals the availability of resources and high readiness to create informal, non-governmental organizations and associations in society, while the emergence of new networks of civic activists indicates that the self-organization potential and growing willingness to participate is gradually being translated into new, more institutionalized participatory channels.

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4. KHARKIV’S PATRONAL POLITICS: PRO-MAIDAN VS ANTI-MAIDAN RIVALRY AND COMPETING POWER PYRAMIDS

Oleksandr Fisun, Anton Avksentiev

Since 2014, all eyes have been on Kharkiv because, without exaggeration, stability throughout Ukraine as a whole strongly depends on stability in this city. The first after Donbas in the “risk zone”, front-line and frontier, with traditionally strong pro-Russian sentiments and with “hybrid” non-ideological coalitions of local authorities with the president’s party – this is what Kharkiv seems to have been since 2014. However, its unique pluralism has even deeper roots. The post-Euromaidan political system is characterized by the rapid development of subnational politics in Ukraine. This process is substantially stimulated by Kyiv’s partial loss of control over regional elites and the relative autonomization of local power pyramids coupled with flourishing local elite pluralism. This autonomization has resulted from the post-Euromaidan partial collapse of central authority simultaneously with the start of decentralization reform, leading to the transfer of financial resources to regional/local governance levels.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the dynamics of the electoral diversity in Kharkiv during the 2004–2019 period and to evaluate its relationship to the binary splits over key national issues, including foreign policy. In this context, the chapter also analyzes the recent “Zelensky factor” in Ukrainian politics. A specific question that is addressed is whether one is witnessing a permanent/temporary removal/reformatting of these splits, and how all this affects the configuration of the local political regime in Kharkiv.

ELECTORAL DYNAMICS IN THE KHARKIV REGION

From the very beginning, and after 2004 in particular, Ukraine’s politics were characterized by the competition between two political projects – the pro-European one versus the pro-Russian one (“Maidan” versus “anti-Maidan”). This cleavage can be explained by the fact that it was precisely in the Maidan phenomenon that almost all of the contours of conflicting identities overlapped. The “Maidan” political forces in Kharkiv traditionally supported Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU, cultural and language Ukrainization, and proactive decommunization. In turn, the “anti-Maidan” forces advocated a rapprochement with Russia and the Customs Union, supported maintaining the special status of the Russian language and, maximally, achieving cultural and political autonomy for the South-East region, especially in issues related to education and history politics. Traditionally, local power pyramids exploited the Maidan vs anti-Maidan political cleavage for political mobilization.

The division between the pro-European and pro-Russian camps had a direct impact on the electoral dynamics in Kharkiv (see Chart 1). Votes were divided between two political projects, in which the pro-Russian one maintained a comfortable majority. For instance, in the 2012 parliamentary election, anti-Maidan forces won over 65% of the votes. After Euromaidan, the gap between the two projects narrowed, while the binary division remained. In 2018, the electorate remained split on the issues of the Russian language, Russian aggression, and foreign policy orientations (see Table 12).

Chart 1. Electoral dynamics of the pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan political forces in the Kharkiv region (2004–2015)81, 82

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81 Source: Central Electoral Commission
82
Table 12. Survey of attitudes in the Kharkiv region (12.2018)

1. Do you consider Russia an aggressor country?

| Yes (35%) | No (48%) | Don’t know (d/k) and Refuse to answer (17%) |

2. How should the Ukrainian and Russian languages co–exist in Ukraine?

| The Ukrainian language is the only state language; The Russian language may be used in life (28%) |
| Ukrainian is the only state language, Russian should be granted official status in certain regions (31%) |
| Russian should become the second state language throughout the country (37%) |
| d/k / Refuse to answer (4%) |

3. If a referendum was held on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, how would you respond?

| For (24%) | Against (56%) | d/k or Refuse to answer (20%) |

4. If Ukraine had to become a member of only one union, which would you select?

| European Union (31%) | Customs Union (20%) | Neither union (36%) | d/k (13%) |

However, the “Zelensky phenomenon” in the 2019 presidential election resulted in the transformation of this established 15-year binary division into a new configuration. During the 2019 presidential election, Volodymyr Zelensky (as well as his party “Servant of the People” in the parliamentary election) were able to enlist the support of the moderate wings of both camps and de facto became that “third force” that temporarily removed the traditional binary splits.


82 Пр: presidential election; пар: parliamentary election; м: local election.

In general, the results of the first round of the 2019 presidential election and parliamentary election were largely similar for the main competitors (adjusted for a decrease in the turnout and the absolute number of votes). Only three political parties in the Kharkiv region won more than 5% of the vote.

Map 1. Which is bigger: “Servant of the People” versus anti-Maidan (blue) in the Kharkiv region
In 2019, the “Maidan block” in the Kharkiv region retained its approximately 30%-strong “core constituency” (a drop to 19% in the parliamentary election was probably due to the demotivation of this group of voters and its low turnout, as well as a partial outflow of votes towards “Servant of the People”). The basic principles of these voters include direct condemnation of Russia’s aggression, calls against strengthening the status of the Russian language, and calls for Ukraine to continue its move towards EU and NATO membership. In 2019, another watershed that separated the pro-Maidan electorate from the majority was a negative attitude towards attempts to peacefully resolve the conflict in Donbas. These attempts were treated by the “pro-Maidan electorate” as a capitulation. Accordingly, one can assume that the typical Volodymyr Zelensky voter in the Kharkiv region, for the most part, is a representative of the “anti-Maidan” camp (in the binary categories of 2004–2014) but, more specifically, of its mod-

### Table 13. Results of the 1st round of the presidential election and parliamentary election in the Kharkiv region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volodymyr Zelensky</td>
<td>Zelensky Party (“Servant of the People”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.41% 482,500</td>
<td>42.72% 436,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuriy Boyko (the first–best anti–Maidan candidate)</td>
<td>“Opposition Platform – For Life” (anti–Maidan party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.58% 352,200</td>
<td>26.55% 271,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petr Poroshenko (the first–best pro–Maidan candidate)</td>
<td>“Solidarity” (pro–Maidan party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.52% 112,900</td>
<td>4.95% 50,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Vilkul (the second–best anti–Maidan candidate)</td>
<td>“Opposition Block” (anti–Maidan party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.47% 99,100</td>
<td>7.78% 79,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yulia Tymoshenko (the second–best pro–Maidan candidate)</td>
<td>“Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland) (pro–Maidan party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.35% 97,500</td>
<td>3.56% 36,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Electoral Commission

84 Opposition Platform – For Life, Opposition Bloc, Party of Shariy.
85 Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Ihor Smeshko, Oleh Lyashko and other candidates who got less than 1%.

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erate wing. The basic principles of this electorate include a demand for peace, the non-aligned status of Ukraine, and strengthening the status of the Russian language. By and large, due to the “novelty” effect and a low negative rating, Volodymyr Zelensky managed to win the competition with Yuriy Boyko for voters opposed to the Poroshenko regime, and whose value system is, for the most part, the antithesis of the pro-Maidan formula “Army. Language. Faith”.

At the same time, with the start of Zelensky’s economic reforms, a gradual “outflow” of his popularity has been set in motion. Moreover, taking into account the ideological specifics of the Kharkiv voters who supported “Servant of the People”, the fruits of the disenchantment in Zelensky in the 2020 local elections in the Kharkiv region may be reaped by the political forces of the “anti-Maidan camp”, namely “Opposition Platform – For Life” and the Mayor of Kharkiv, Hennadiy Kernes.

**ELECTORAL DYNAMICS IN THE CITY OF KHARKIV IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPETITION BETWEEN PRO-EUROPEAN VS. PRO-RUSSIAN POLITICAL PROJECTS**

In order to get a better idea of Kharkiv’s electoral diversity, it is worth analysing the results of the 2002-2019 elections by city districts (ray-ons). Table 14 summarizes the overall voting for the so-called “pro-Maidan forces”.
Table 14. Pro-Maidan dynamics in the Kharkiv city districts (rayons) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shevchenkovsky</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novobavarsky</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyivsky</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slobodsky</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moskovsky</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holodnogorysky</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nemyshliansky</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialny</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osnoviansky</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Electoral Commission

If the administrative district is taken as the unit of analysis for the electoral-spatial features of Kharkiv, the Shevchenkovskiy and Kyivsky districts register relatively stronger “pro-Maidan” sentiments. Accordingly, the lowest vote for pro-Maidan forces was recorded in the Industrialny district on the outskirts of the city.

What kind of factors can explain this centre–periphery pattern? There are no data on the ethnic or linguistic configuration within the Kharkiv districts, although substantial internal heterogeneity for these variables is quite rare for the Ukrainian cities taken separately. The centre–periphery division is a product of several factors – socio–economic, professional and educational. There has been a steady tendency for residents from more central areas to vote for “Maidan” forces. Support for the so-called “Maidan” forces is higher in the more “expensive” and “educated” downtown area of Kharkiv and lower on the industrial working class outskirts.87

87 The April 2019 residential property price for central downtown districts is USD 991–1,025 per m2 and USD 473–619 per m2 for the peripheral industrial districts. Source: https://proconsul.com.ua/press-center/analitika/monitoring_vtorichnoho_rynka_zhilya_goroda_Kharkova_v_aprele_2019_goda.html.
Table 15. Impact analysis of voting in the Kharkiv region: language, ethnicity, proximity to the Russian border

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative division</th>
<th>Ukr. Ethn. (%)</th>
<th>Ukr. Lang. (%)</th>
<th>Border (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izyum</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupiyansk</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozova</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyubotin</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pervomaiskij</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuguyiv</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balaklijskij</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barvinkivskij</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bliznyukivskij</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>224</td>
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Pro-Maidan (%)
All of the considered cases show a positive correlation between the results of the Maidan parties and three key factors. In general, the territories (districts and cities) vote for Maidan parties more when more people are ethnic Ukrainians with Ukrainian as their native language and when the Russian border is far away (the cross-border factor is slightly weaker than ethnicity and language). However, the nature of the political regime cannot be revealed merely through voter demands and value attitudes. Its essence has to lie in another dimension – not in the value-ideological one, but the one related to the operations of political machines, patron-client rent-seeking networks, and power pyramids. It may well be the case that the discussed centre-peripheral patterns can be explained by the mechanics of local “electoral machines”, which tend to accumulate the “cheaper votes” of less well-off voters living on the outskirts.

**PLURALISM OF LOCAL ELITES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS**

After the 2014–2015 local elections, the new political regime in Kharkiv was associated with a relatively high pluralism of rent-seeking networks and competition between power pyramids. In 2015, several power pyramids emerged. The first pyramid, headed by Mayor Hennadiy Kernes, controlled the electoral and, indirectly, the administrative resource. The head of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration (KhRSA), Yulia Svitlychna, represented the second one, which was a sub-part of the presidential pyramid controlled by the head Administration of President Ihor Raynin. It also possessed the administrative resource and partially the fiscal and coercive resources through the regional branches of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Prosecutor’s Office. The third pyramid was connected with the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), Arsen Avakov, who was previously a head of the Kharkiv regional state administration and a long-established leader of an influential regional business group. The MIA has become one of the main power centres in the post-Euromaidan system with control over paramilitary groups and voluntary battalions, rents, and leverage over political processes. In 2015–2019, the Kharkiv elite manoeuvred in this “Mayor-KhRSA/AP-MIA” triangle, but their ultimate goal was to access an autonomous direct channel of patronage-client relations with the president.

Their rivalry sparked conflicts that affected the presidential campaign in 2019. In September 2018, the vast majority of local politicians and businessmen publicly announced support for Petro Poroshenko, while...
reportedly negotiating with Yulia Tymoshenko. Yet, by the end of 2018, relations between the mayor of Kharkiv and the AP-KhRSA presidential pyramid abruptly worsened, reportedly due to disputes over the control of financial flows. The division of campaign funds between Hennadiy Kernes, in charge of the presidential campaign in Kharkiv, and Yuliya Svitlychna, responsible for the rest of the Kharkiv region, dissatisfied Raynin, Svitlychna and the local organization of the “Solidarity–BPP”, and intensified their contacts with the opposition. On December 26, Hennadiy Kernes launched the first public attack against Svitlychna, blaming her for blocking city projects and calling their relationship “unsatisfactory”. In mid-January, Yuliya Svitlychna and Arsen Avakov delivered a joint statement on the severity of the opposition to any attempts to rig the elections. Between the lines of this statement, one could read the refusal to use their resources (administrative and power) in favour of Petro Poroshenko.

At the same time, due to the “electoral toxicity” of Petro Poroshenko, the Kharkiv elite tried to maintain a balance between Kyiv and the local electorate, demonstrating support for Poroshenko that would be recognized in Kyiv, but that would not annoy the Kharkiv voters too much. Such a “double game” often led to odd situations: for example, on New Year’s greeting cards sent to Kharkiv on behalf of Hennadiy Kernes and Petro Poroshenko, there was an image of a monument to Lenin in Freedom Square, which had been dismantled back in 2014.

The illusion of support and the competition for financial resources among the Kharkiv elite was a natural result of Petro Poroshenko’s patron-client strategy chosen by the president himself. The main components of this strategy were as follows:

1) levelling ideological and value factors, and the party background in the selection of “bosses” who have to promote the president’s agenda on the ground.
2) granting financial rewards to the “bosses” in the framework of decentralization, while maintaining the same level of corruption rent.
3) controlling bosses via criminal cases brought against them or against people in their inner circle.

This model was applied in the southeastern regions, in which the electoral potential of Petro Poroshenko was minimal, and the ideological and value platform (“Army. Language. Faith”) was not popular. The strategy was aimed both at the mayors of regional centres (primarily Hennadiy Kernes in Kharkiv, Hennadiy Trukhanov in Odesa, and Borys Filatov in
Dnipro) and at the heads of the united territorial communities at the local governance level. However, ultimately, having relied on rather odious politicians and ex-members of the “Party of Regions” network, treated negatively by the president’s core electorate, Petro Poroshenko put himself in an extremely vulnerable and dependent position. As a result, in the local elections of October 2015, the president’s candidates lost in the largest regional centres of Ukraine, including Kharkiv, Dnipro, Odesa, and Lviv, despite the active expansion of the presidential network at the local and regional levels. Hence, Petro Poroshenko fundamentally overlooked the specifics of the local political machines, whereby an effective local machine policy implies levelling the diversity of the ideological and value attitudes of voters.

Since 2014, a new two-tier political system has emerged in Ukraine’s neopatrimonial regime. Sub-national political regimes, dominated by relatively autonomous local power pyramids, are entering into various arrangements with national political players, mostly with the incumbent. Local political regimes (regional, city, local) in Ukraine are much more stable than national ones. These elites retain control of the city and, in different formats, integrate themselves into the nationwide regimes, which depend on their electoral support.

Lastly, in the second half of 2019, another rent-seeking network emerged, which “made a bet” on Volodymyr Zelensky in the presidential election and quickly strengthened. This adjusted the established “balance of power” in the Kharkiv region. This network is represented by veterans of the State Border Service, Vadim Slyusarev and Pavel Sushko, and has centered around 34-year-old Oleksiy Kucher, the head of KRSA, since November 2019.

CONCLUSION

Kharkiv city’s voting patterns demonstrate a strong correlation with economic issues/modernization (Maidan as a middle-class anti-oligarchic pro-rule-of-law movement) and the low significance of language/identity issues. Kharkiv region voting, on the other hand, demonstrates a strong correlation with language/identity as a tool for pro-Maidan popular mobilization.

The success of Zelensky and the “Servant of the People” party during the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections demonstrated a break

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with the traditional Maidan/anti-Maidan ideological division, and the steady formation of a new hybrid political platform based on the depoliticization of language/identity issues combined with the incorporation of a predominant Maidan narrative, namely one about the anti-oligarchic/middle-class movement (free and fair elections, economic modernization, and the rule of law). The successful appropriation of the key Maidan/Euromaidan economic/anti-oligarchic agenda with the marginalization of controversial language/identity issues, including decommunization, has created new overwhelmingly popular support for Zelensky’s political project, especially in southeast Ukraine.

At the same time, since 2014, local politics has become more pluralist and local power pyramids more autonomous, while competing with each other for control over the city and the region. Their control of local votes levels the diversity of ideological and value attitudes, which makes their electoral support even more vital for national political players, and the incumbents in particular. As a result, the Kyiv authorities and local elites are increasingly interdependent as the former depend on local elites electorally, whereas the latter look for additional revenues and rent opportunities from Kyiv.
Identity has been a major factor in Ukrainian politics. From 1994 onwards, ethno-linguistic cleavages divided the country and had highly polarizing effects on Ukrainian politics. The regional dimension played a significant role. In November 2004, during the Orange Revolution, when Victor Yanukovych’s victory in the second round was challenged, the southeastern elites threatened to form the Southeast Ukrainian Autonomous Republic with a capital in Kharkiv. Similarly, when Victor Yanukovych fled from Kyiv to Kharkiv on February 22, 2014, he originally intended to attend a congress of southeast regions – supposedly to support a call for federalization. However, the post-Euromaidan presidential and parliamentary elections witnessed striking changes, when the victories of Petro Poroshenko in 2014 and Volodymyr Zelensky in 2019 showed that Ukraine was more united on key issues than had previously been believed, and that the pro-European choice had stable support across previous regional splits.

This report has taken stock of the identity evolution that has taken place since 2014, and has attempted to revisit the effects of these shifts on Ukrainian politics and foreign policy orientations. To this end, the key findings are as follows.

At the national level, as Mariia Zolkina argues, shifts in the socio-political identification within society and the foreign policy priorities have contributed to the rise of civic identity in the country, construction of the political nation, and long-term changes in the political culture. The strengthening of the “citizenship” identity has also weakened regional self-identification in the South and East, where regional distinctions...
were particularly acute before 2014. The regional self-identification as the prevalent one duly diminished more than twofold between 2013 and 2019.

Mykola Riabchuk showed that Western Ukraine, and Lviv in particular, have maintained a stronger national identity as well as broader support for a set of values deemed “European” – democracy, liberalism, freedom of speech, a free market and civic participation, exemplified to a certain extent by the fact that three quarters of the inhabitants of Lviv regard themselves as belonging to the middle class. Overall, Mykola Riabchuk confirms Mariia Zolkina’s conclusions, underlining that Ukraine’s regions have gradually evolved in the same – pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western – direction in terms of their identities and political attitudes.

Tetiana Kryvosheia and Oksana Lychkovska-Nebot identify a decrease in linguistic cleavages and in support for federalization in Odesa. For Maidan and anti-Maidan supporters alike, language and regional affiliation have become secondary. Yet they also point to the emergence of a dividing line between “old” versus “new” values, associated with paternalism and the desire for a strong hand, on the one hand, and the aspiration for change and more participatory and democratic governance on the other. This value division correlates with age, education and income, as well as with such integral indicators as the degree of social activity in general and the level of social embeddedness.

With regard to the political effects of these developments in the East, Oleksandr Fisun and Anton Avksentiev identified changes in electoral preferences in the context of local politics in Kharkiv. In general, districts and towns in the Kharkiv region – in which more people are ethnic Ukrainians and identify Ukrainian as their native language, and which are located further away from the Russian border – tend to vote for pro-Maidan parties. At the same time, the “Zelensky factor” re-formatted the binary “Maidan” vs “anti-Maidan” political divisions. Volodymyr Zelensky and his party enlisted the support of the moderate wings of both camps and became the third major force in the region with their own local power pyramid. In conclusion, the writers show that local politics has become more competitive and pluralist, while the national political forces depend more on the electoral support of local power pyramids.

Overall, the authors largely agree that foreign policy orientations in all regions recorded stronger pro-Western (primarily pro-EU but also pro-NATO) preferences. If Lviv was traditionally united behind Euro-Atlantic integration, the rapid rise of support in the southeast after 2014 was a radical break with past tendencies.

These new trends provide new opportunities for nation- and state-building in Ukraine. However, there are several notable challenges
that need to be taken into consideration. First, although the observed identity shifts are considerable, their sustainability should not be taken for granted. The Euromaidan Revolution and the de-facto war with Russia created a mobilizing effect and sparked the rise of identification with the state across the country. However, the effect of these two major events was not only lower than one might expect; some noticeable erosion has already been witnessed in the southeast, which remains polarized over key foreign policy issues.

Second, even though the ethno-linguistic cleavages were somewhat mitigated, they did not disappear completely, and divisions still exist in the southeast over the Russian language and its status. Even if they remain secondary and had a weak impact in the latest elections, they are still a factor in Ukrainian politics. In this regard, the lack of elite renewal at the national and regional level poses a particular threat to the above-mentioned shifts and the sustainability of their political effects. De-Russification and the rise of civic identity were largely a bottom-up development, while the elite-driven nation-building policies received mixed reactions across the country and among local elites. Moreover, the disappearance of identity ambivalence among Russian-speakers has not translated into new defined orientations. Large societal groups remain undecided on key issues and thus are susceptible to new forms of manipulation by the old elites. In this regard, there is a potential risk of the elite’s partial return to identity issues for electoral purposes.

Yet, most importantly, new divisive lines along value orientations have gradually gained prominence in the country and across the regions. The socio-economic challenges and anti-establishment sentiment have come to the forefront of public opinion, which has also reshaped the political agenda. In the 2019 presidential election, all of the major candidates except the incumbent Petro Poroshenko put issues like high energy tariffs, and a pledge to fight corruption and be a “strong hand” at the heart of their campaigns. The potential threat of left populism undoubtedly exists in the country, and this is further aggravated by the current pre-eminence of paternalist values in Ukrainian society.
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Since the Euromaidan Revolution, self-identification and attitudes within Ukrainian society have changed profoundly. This report takes stock of the identity changes both nationwide and in three major oblasts, namely Lviv, Kharkiv and Odesa, representing in this study the Western, Eastern and Southern regions of the country respectively, to identify new differences and unity points.

To this end, the report focuses on two major issues, looking firstly at the trajectory of the identity shifts nationwide and in three key regions, and secondly, at their political effects. The question of the sustainability of the changes is also addressed.

Taking the regional aspect into consideration is crucial given that cleavages have traditionally had a visible regional pattern, and that the identity shifts coincide with a realignment of centre-periphery relations within the context of the ongoing reforms, particularly decentralization. The report also furthers understanding of the potential risks – or lack thereof – of this process for the Ukrainian state.

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